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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
VS. 
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Supreme Court Case No. 40985 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada. 
HONORABLE MICHAEL MCLAUGHLIN 
ED GUERRICABEITIA 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
000002
Date: 6/11/2013 
Time: 1 0:28 AM 
Page 1 of 3 
Fourth Judicial District Court- Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-MD-2011-0017076 Current Juqge: Michael Mclaughlin 
Defendant: Nicolescu, Kevin Michael 
User: CCTHIEBJ 
State of Idaho vs. Kevin Michael Nicolescu 
Date 
10/25/2011 
10/27/2011 
10/28/2011 
10/31/2011 
11/2/2011 
11/3/2011 
11/4/2011 
11/14/2011 
11/16/2011 
12/1/2011 
12/2/2011 
12/5/2011 
12/19/2011 
Code 
NCRM 
PROS 
APNG 
RQDD 
RQDD 
MOTN 
CHGA 
HRSC 
HRSC 
RQDD 
HRSC 
ORDR 
RSDS 
RQDS 
RSDS 
HRHD 
CRCO 
RSDS 
MOTN 
MEMO 
AFFD 
HRVC 
HRHD 
HRSC 
PTMM 
User Judge 
TCWADAMC New Case Filed - Misdemeanor 
[Citation issued 1 0/15/11] 
Magistrate Court Clerk 
TCWADAMC Prosecutor assigned Boise City Prosecutor-
Generic 
Magistrate Court Clerk 
TCLANGAJ Appear & Plead Not Guilty/Guerricabeitia Magistrate Court Clerk 
Magistrate Court Clerk 
Magistrate Court Clerk 
TCLAI\JGAJ 
TCLANGAJ 
TCLAI\JGAJ 
TCTURNJM 
TCTURNJM 
TCTURN.IM 
TCTURNJM 
TCLANGAJ 
TCTORRGR 
TCFINNDE 
TCLAI\JGAJ 
TCLANGAJ 
TCLANGAJ 
TCMCCOSL 
TCMCCOSL 
TCOLSOMC 
TCOLSOMC 
TCOLSOMC 
TCTONGES 
TCFINNDE 
TCFINNDE 
TCFII\INDE 
TCFINNDE 
TCFINNDE 
Defendant's Request for Discovery 
Defendant's Request for Discovery 
[duplicate entry] 
Motion for Extension for Filing Pretrial Motions 
Judge Change: Administrative 
Hearing Scheduled (BC Pretrial Conference 
12/19/2011 02:15PM) 
Magistrate Court Clerk 
John Hawley Jr. 
John Hawley Jr. 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 01/13/2012 08:15 John Hawley Jr. 
AM) 
Notice of Hearing 
Defendant's Request for Discovery/Second 
Request 
Hearing Scheduled (File Memo I Review 
11/16/2011 08:30AM) pc 
Order for Extension for Filing PT Motions 
State/City Response to Discovery 
State/City Request for Discovery 
John Hawley Jr. 
John Hawley Jr. 
John Hawley Jr. 
John Hawley Jr. 
John Hawley Jr. 
John Hawley Jr. 
State/City Response to Discovery/Supplemental John Hawley Jr. 
Hearing result for File Memo I Review scheduled John Hawley Jr. 
on 11/16/2011 08:30AM: Hearing Held pc 
Criminal Complaint John Hawley Jr. 
State/City Response to Discovery I Supplemental John Hawley Jr. 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence John Hawley Jr. 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion John Hawley Jr. 
to Suppress Evidence 
Affidavit of Kevin Michael Nicolescu in Support of John Hawley Jr. 
Motion to Suppress Evidence 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on John Hawley Jr. 
01/13/2012 08:15AM: Hearing Vacated 
Hearing result for BC Pretrial Conference John Hawley Jr. 
scheduled on 12/19/2011 02:15PM: Hearing 
Held- Set for Motion Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/14/2012 03:30 John Hawley Jr. 
PM) 
Notice of Hearing John Hawley Jr. 
[file stamped 12/27/2011] 
Pretrial Memorandum John Hawley Jr. 
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Date: 6/11/2013 
Time: 10:28 AM 
Page 2 of 3 
Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CR-MD-2011-0017076 Current Judge: Michael Mclaughlin 
Defendant Nicolescu, Kevin Michael 
User: CCTHIEBJ 
State of Idaho vs. Kevin Michael Nicolescu 
Date 
1/24/2012 
2/6/2012 
4/6/2012 
4/13/2012 
6/11/2012 
6/14/2012 
7/2/2012 
7/25/2012 
8/16/2012 
8/17/2012 
8/29/2012 
8/31/2012 
9/12/2012 
9/24/2012 
10/2/2012 
Code 
STIP 
ORDR 
CONT 
BREF 
PTMM 
CONT 
CONT 
CONT 
HRSC 
HRHD 
MEMO 
HRVC 
PTMM 
HRSC 
APDC 
CAAP 
CHGA 
MOTN 
NOTC 
OGAP 
ORDR 
HRVC 
LDGD 
User 
TCTONGES 
TCFINNDE 
TCFINNDE 
TCFINNDE 
TCTONGES 
TCFINNDE 
TCFINNDE 
TCFINNDE 
TCFINNDE 
TCFINNDE 
TCFINNDE 
TCFINNDE 
TCFINNDE 
TCFINNDE 
Judge 
Stipulation to Continue Defendant's Motion to John Hawley Jr. 
Suppress Evidence Scheduled on February 14, 
2012 
Order to Conitnue Hearing John Hawley Jr. 
Continued (Motion 04/13/2012 09:30AM) John Hawley Jr. 
Notice of Hearing John Hawley Jr. 
[file stamped 02/08/2012] 
Brief in Opposition to the Suppression of Lifeloc John Hawley Jr. 
Breath Test Results 
Pretrial Memorandum John Hawley Jr. 
Continued (Motion 06/11/2012 03:30PM) 
Notice of Hearing 
[file stamped 04/16/2012] 
Continued (Motion 07/05/2012 03:30PM) 
Notice of Hearing 
[not located in file - possibly entered in error] 
Continued (Motion 07/02/2012 03:30PM) 
Notice of Hearing 
[file stamped 06/15/2012] 
Hearing Scheduled (BC Pretrial Conference 
08/16/2012 08:15AM) 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 
07/02/2012 03:30PM: Hearing Held 
John Hawley Jr. 
John Hawley Jr. 
John Hawley Jr. 
John Hawley Jr. 
John Hawley Jr. 
John Hawley Jr. 
John Hawley Jr. 
John Hawley Jr. 
TCFINNDE Memorandum Decision Regarding Motion to John Hawley Jr. 
Suppress 
TCFINI\IDE Hearing result for BC Pretrial Conference John Hawley Jr. 
scheduled on 08/16/2012 08:15AM: Hearing 
Vacated 
TCWEGEKE Pretrial Memorandum and Minute Entry Michael McLaughlin 
TCFINNDE Hearing Scheduled (File Memo/Review John Hawley Jr. 
09/28/2012 03:00 PM) 
TCTONGES Appeal Filed In District Court John Hawley Jr. 
TCTONGES 
TCTONGES 
TCTONGES 
TCOLSOMC 
DCLYKEMA 
TCFINNDE 
TCFINNDE 
TCTONGES 
Case Appealed: 
Judge Change: Administrative 
Motion to Hold Matter in Aberyance Pending 
Appeal 
Notice of Preparation of Appeal Transcript 
Order Governing Procedure On Appeal 
Order Holding Matter in Abeyance Pending 
Appeal 
John Hawley Jr. 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Michael Mclaughlin 
John Hawley Jr. 
Hearing result for File Memo/Review scheduled John Hawley Jr. 
on 09/28/2012 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated-
Appeal filed 
Notice of Lodging of Appeal Transcript Kathryn A. Sticklen 
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Date: 6/11/2013 Fourth Judicial District Court- Ada County User: CCTHIEBJ 
Time: 1 0:28 AM ROA Report 
P<:1ge 3 of 3 Case: CR-MD-2011-0017076 Current Judge: Michael Mclaughlin 
Defendant: Nicolescu, Kevin Michael 
State of Idaho vs. Kevin Michael Nicolescu 
Date Code User Judge 
10/26/2012 TRAN DCCHESBD Transcript Filed Michael Mclaughlin 
NOFG DCCHESBD Notice Of Filing of Transcript Michael Mclaughlin 
11/28/2012 BREF TCCHRIKE Appellant's Brief Kathryn A. Sticklen 
12/21/2012 BREF TCTONGES Respondent's Brief Kathryn A. Sticklen 
1/10/2013 BREF TCTONGES Reply Brief Kathryn A. Sticklen 
1/23/2013 NOHG TCTONGES Notice Of Hearing Kathryn A. Sticklen 
HRSC TCTONGES Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Kathryn A. Sticklen 
02/20/2013 01 :00 PM) 
1/25/2013 NOHG TCTONGES Amended Notice Of Hearing Kathryn A. Sticklen 
HRSC TCTONGES Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Kathryn A. Sticklen 
04/03/2013 01:00 PM) 
2/20/2013 HRVC DCKORSJP Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Kathryn A. Sticklen 
on 02/20/2013 01:00PM: Hearing Vacated 
3/22/2013 CHGA TCLYCAAM Judge Change: Administrative Michael Mclaughlin 
4/3/2013 DCHH TCLYCAAM Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled Michael Mclaughlin 
on 04/03/2013 01:00PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Mia Martorelli 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 
4/9/2013 STIP TCFINNDE Stipulation to Supplement Evidence in John Hawley Jr. 
Suppression Hearing 
ORDR TCFINNDE Order Supplementing Evidence in Suppression John Hawley Jr. 
Hearing 
STJP TCFINNDE Stipulation Augmenting the Record on Appeal Michael Mclaughlin 
4/16/2013 ORDR TCLYCAAM Order Augmenting the Record on Appeal Michael Mclaughlin 
MEMO TCLYCAAM Memorandum Decision and Order- Motion to Michael Mclaughlin 
Supress is Reversed 
5/3/2013 APSC TCTONGES Appealed To The Supreme Court Michael Mclaughlin 
NOTA CCTHIEBJ NOTICE OF APPEAL Michael Mclaughlin 
6/11/2013 NOTC CCTHIEBJ Notice of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court Michael Mclaughlin 
Docket No. 40985 
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BOISE POLICE DEPT. 
IDAHO UNIFORM CITATION ~f:-;.4 ;) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 4TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF .· 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA / 
STATE OF IDAHO COMPLAINT AND SUMMONS 
0 Infraction Citation 
o:::::::t" vs. ~ Misdemeanor Citation ~ NIC-aC~SC-1..( 0Accident Involved 
o.::::t Last Name 0 Commercial Vehicle 
Driven by this Driver ~ ';!::.~'! 1' ""'~); I D><.,.t.:o:>o<.~ 
VIN# [AI(,SP /1 Y '2 ~~~'1 l"b' USDOTTKCensus# ______ _ 
~Operator 0 Class A 0 Class B 0 Class C ~Class D 0 Other ______ _ 
0 GVWR 26001 + 0 16 + Pe?s 0 Placard Haz~ous Materials IPUC# ____ _ 
Home Address    ! Vt:J(S.e X'o ~7D3 
Business Address - Ph #  
THE UNDERSIGNED OFFICER (PARTY) HEREBY CERTIFIES AND SAYS: 
ltY DL 0 10 0 V I certify I have reasonable grounds, and believe the above-named Defendant, 
DL or SS#  r Stat~.O Sex: MJ ~ 0 F 
Height ft, '0 Wt. //PO Hair '81(1.1 Eyes S,e.N DOB  
Veh. Lie.#   . State JZ.o Yr. of Vehicle ;49~ 
Make 1'1 I '!J S S E" Color ~6.LL::.!:..7v~----ll at t?Z.-12.. o·croCk .4 M. 
Vio.#1 ~~~~~~~~~~~--------------'~~-'-~~~= e, /!...f't {_- Code Section 
Vio. #2 
Code Section 
Location "Xt>ltlfa / I" /H 
Hwy . .,.---,---~----Mp._______ __A~D"-A'--_County, Idaho. 
(/) f,r; Itt PAl-IC- ~5~ Audio V"ldeo 
-- ---- -=L.---LJ-t,=-:.-=---------.=:;.:::"-,-rL,--,..-----~0 YLI'til!POUCEDEPT. 
Date' • Officer/Party Serial #/Address 
(!Jf,t£/tt fl/0/)k:£ t .. (33 JS!!p 
Dater Witnessing Officer Serial #/Address Dept. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT: 
You are hereby summoned to appear before the Clerk of the Magistrate's Court of the 
District Court of ADA County, BOISE , Idaho, 
located at 200 W. FRONT STREET on or after l t>) ~ , 20 _jJ__, 
but on or before C I /'-( , 20 I 1 , at 8 A.M.-4 o'clock ~M. 
I acknO\~dge<mx:eiP.ttJ>f this summons and I promise to appear at the time indicated. 
p? :J m $E'~v~""'7 
0 0 Defendant's Signature g t...:J m 
I hereb~rtifyC~;~~rviC'e"upon the defend::rersonally on !0/n::;--
g ·~ ; ~!1.L-- ~~$""~ ,20 """''--''--
1!2. :... ., Officer 
NOTICEt See reverse side of your copy for PENALTY and COMPLIANCE instructions. 
COURT COPY VIOLATION #1 
( { -l7o7f, 
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ED GUERRICABEITIA 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE 
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza, Suite 600 
Attorneys at Law 
199 North Capitol Boulevard 
Post Office Box 1583 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-3658 
Facsimile: (208) 386-9428 
ISB No. 6148 
Attorneys for Defendant 
NO .• ~ 
A.M~ .. _meo~JJ ~P.M ...... _:;_;;._=j-+--
OCT 2 7 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By AMY LANG 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KEVIN NICOLESCU, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076 
Citation No.: 1484104 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE; ENTRY 
OF NOT GUILTY PLEA; DEMAND 
FOR SPEEDY JURY TRIAL; AND 
DEMAND FOR SWORN COMPLAINT 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Kevin Nicolescu, by and through his attorney of record, 
Ed Guerricabeitia of the firm Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple, of Boise, Idaho, and pursuant 
to Rule 6( d), of the Idaho Misdemeanor Criminal Rules, hereby enters his appearance and his 
plea of not guilty to each and every charge in the above-entitled matter. 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE; ENTRY OF NOT GUILTY PLEA; DEMAND FOR SPEEDY JURY TRIAL; 
AND DEMAND FOR SWORN COMPLAINT - 1 
000007
. ,. 
Pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 13 
of the Constitution of the State of Idaho; and Idaho Code, Section 19-3501, Defendant 
respectfully demands a speedy jury trial. 
Pursuant to Rule 3( d), Idaho Misdemeanor Criminal Rules, Defendant respectfully 
demands that a sworn complaint be filed for each offense charged by uniform citation in the 
above-entitled action. 
All future pleadings, correspondence and other documents relating to this matter should 
be forwarded to Ed Guerricabeitia of the firm of Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple, as attorney 
for Defendant, Kevin Nicolescu, at the above-referenced address. 
DATED this Jl!day of October, 2011. 
By: 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE 
Ed Guerricabeitia, of the firm 
Attorneys for Defendant 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE; ENTRY OF NOT GUILTY PLEA; DEMAND FOR SPEEDY JURY TRIAL; 
AND DEMAND FOR SWORN COMPLAINT - 2 
000008
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ..71-Aday of October, 2011, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual, by the method 
indicated, and addressed as follows: 
Boise City Attorney's Office 
P.O. Box500 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500 
[v( 
[ ] 
[ ] 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile 
Ed Guerricabeitia 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE; ENTRY OF NOT GUILTY PLEA; DEMAND FOR SPEEDY JURY TRIAL; 
AND DEMAND FOR SWORN COMPLAINT - 3 
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ED GUERRICABEITIA 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE 
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza, Suite 600 
Attorneys at Law 
199 North Capitol Boulevard 
Post Office Box 1583 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-3658 
Facsimile: (208) 386-9428 
ISB No. 6148 
Attorneys for Defendant 
AM FILED~ -
----P.M.~-.-.=-~--~ 
OCT 2 7 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By AMY LANG 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076 
Citation No.: 1484104 
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR 
DISCOVERY TO PLAINTIFF 
KEVIN NICOLESCU, 
Defendant. 
, 
TO: BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Kevin Nicolescu, by and through his counsel, and 
pursuant to I.C.R. 16, hereby requests discovery and inspection of all materials discoverable per 
I.C.R. 16 b (1-8), including but not limited to, the following: 
1. Statement of the Defendant. Copies of any and all statements and/or 
communications made by the Defendant, whether oral, written or otherwise, to any law 
enforcement agent, prosecutor, official, or anyone involved with or connected to the 
investigation or prosecution of this case, the existence of which is known or which is 
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY TO PLAINTIFF - 1 
000010
available to the prosecuting attorney by the exercise of due diligence, and all formal and 
informal notes related to such statements or communications, and also the substance of 
any relevant or oral statement made by the Defendant - whether before or after arrest - to 
a peace officer, prosecuting attorney or his agent, and the recorded testimony of the 
Defendant before a Grand Jury which relates to the offense charged. 
2. Statement of Co-Defendant. Any written or recorded statements by a co-
Defendant, and the substance of any relevant oral statement made by a co-Defendant 
whether before or after arrest in response to interrogation by any person known by the co-
Defendant to be a peace officer or agent of the prosecuting attorney. 
3. Defendant's prior record. A copy of the Defendant's entire prior criminal 
record, if any, as is then or may become available to the prosecuting attorney, and a 
description, summary and/or listing of any or all "bad acts" or occurrences the 
prosecution intends to introduce against the Defendant or that the prosecution may use 
against any witness or co-defendant for purposes of cross-examination or as rebuttal to 
character evidence introduced by Defendant or by his/her witnesses. 
4. Documents and tangible objects. Books, papers, documents, audio or video 
recordings, photographs, blood, tangible objects, or copies or portions thereof, which are 
intended for use by the prosecutor as evidence at trial, or obtained from or belonging to 
the Defendant, with a chain of custody record for each such item, pursuant to Rule 
16(b)(4). 
5. Video or audio recordings. Permit the Defendant to inspect and copy any and 
all video or audio recordings which are in the possession, custody or control of the State, 
of any conversations between the Defendant, or co-Defendant and any agent of the State. 
Without limiting the foregoing, the Defendant requests copies of the following records: 
A. All audio and/or video recordings in connection with this matter. 
B. A copy of the log sheet for the breath or blood testing device or 
laboratory used to test the Defendant's blood alcohol content, which log sheet 
should reflect all tests conducted on the same date as the Defendant was tested or 
his blood was analyzed. 
C. A copy of the calibration certificates for the breath or blood testing device 
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY TO PLAINTIFF -2 
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or techniques used to administer an evidentiary test for alcohol concentration to 
the Defendant for the period commencing at least six months prior to the 
Defendant's arrest and continuing to the date of trial. 
D. A copy of any current certificate or record indicating that the individual 
who administered the breath test to the Defendant, or analyzed the Defendant's 
blood is qualified to conduct said test or analysis. 
E. A copy of any record available indicating the extent of the training and 
experience in breath or blood testing of the individual who administered the 
breath or blood test to the Defendant, with regard to the specific instrument or 
technique used to administer or analyze the test. 
F. A copy of any record available indicating the extent of the training and 
experience of the individual who actually drew any blood from the Defendant. 
G. A copy of any record or report indicating the technique or method used to 
draw any blood from the Defendant. 
H. A copy of the manual of procedures governing the administration of 
breath or blood tests at the facility where the Defendant was tested or his blood 
was analyzed. 
I. The date of any repairs or maintenance performed on the machine used to 
test the Defendant's blood alcohol, during the three months prior to the testing of 
the Defendant, and the nature of any such repairs or maintenance. 
J. The date of any repairs or maintenance performed on the machine used to 
test the Defendant's blood alcohol, from the date of testing of the Defendant up to 
the date of trial, and the nature of such repairs or maintenance. 
K. A copy of the operator's manual for the machine used to test the 
Defendant's breath or blood and the date and test of all additions, deletions, 
modifications or changes made to the operator's manual. 
L. The number of times within the last two years that the machine used to test 
the Defendant's breath or blood has been tested to determine its ability to detect 
acetone or other "interferents," and the results of any such tests. 
M. A copy of any repair or maintenance log kept with regard to the machine 
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY TO PLAINTIFF -3 
000012
which was used to test the Defendant's breath or blood. 
N. A current copy of any and all regulations adopted by the Idaho 
Department of Health and Welfare or Department of Law Enforcement with 
regard to the conduct of forensic alcohol examinations or with regard to quality 
control and proficiency testing at clinical laboratories. 
0. Provide a written copy of the dispatcher's radio log and all other logs 
which indicate the time of the stop of the Defendant and time of arrival at the jail, 
to include but not limited to the C.C.R. log pertaining to the arrival of the 
Defendant. 
6. Reports of examinations and tests. Permit the Defendant to inspect and copy or 
photograph any results of reports of physical or mental examinations and of scientific 
tests or experiments made in connections with this particular case, or copies thereof, 
which are intended for use by the prosecutor as evidence at trial, pursuant to Rule 
16(b)(5). Without limiting the foregoing, Defendant requests copies of the following 
specific tests: 
A. A copy of the print-out from the last breath test prior to Defendant's 
wherein acetone or any other "interferent" was detected by the breath analysis 
machine. 
B. A copy of the print-outs from the seven breath tests administered prior to 
the test administered to the Defendant. 
C. The results of any test conducted by any agent of the State of Idaho or any 
other governmental entity to determine the effect of radio frequency interference 
(RFI) on the machine used to analyze the blood or breath of the Defendant. 
D. The results of any test conducted by the manufacturer of the machine used 
to test the Defendant's breath or blood to determine its susceptibility to distortion 
of results by radio frequency interference (RFI). 
E. A copy of all proficiency test results or on-site evaluation studies 
conducted with regard to the facility at which the Defendant's breath or blood was 
tested and such results for the individual who conducted the test of the 
Defendant's blood alcohol content during the period commencing one year prior 
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY TO PLAINTIFF - 4 
000013
.. 
to the Defendant's arrest and continuing to the date of trial. 
F. Any and all lab reports. 
7. State witnesses. A written list of the names, addresses and telephone numbers of 
all persons having knowledge of relevant facts who may be called by the prosecuting 
attorney as witnesses at trial, together with any record of prior felony convictions of any 
such person, and copies of any and all statements, whether oral, written or otherwise, 
made by the prosecution's witnesses, or prospective witnesses, to the prosecuting attorney 
or his agents, or to any law enforcement agent or official involved in the investigation of 
the case and a summary of each witness's prospective testimony, pursuant to Rule 
16(b)(6). 
8. Police and Dispatch reports. All reports, memoranda, notes, audio and/or video 
recordings, cell phone records, dispatch transcripts, and dispatch audio made by any law 
enforcement agent in the investigation or the prosecution of this case and involving 
Defendant or any other witness or person involved in this case. 
9. Jail Records. Copies of all jail records for the Defendant, included but not 
limited to booking slips, cell-mate records, and any other reports, memoranda or records 
made in connection with the booking process related to this case, surety or bond records 
and personal property records for the Defendant. Also, copies of any recorded 
conversations, whether oral, written or otherwise, between the Defendant and any third 
person while Defendant was incarcerated or held at any detention facility. 
10. Immigration Materials. If there was or is an immigration hold on Defendant, 
copies of any immigration holds, any and all records, notes, logs or communications with 
the Department of Immigration and Naturalization, the Department of Homeland 
Security, ICE, or other state or federal government agencies, agents, or any other 
individual regarding the immigration status of Defendant, copies of each agreement and 
contract the jail, city, county or state has with Immigration or Homeland Security 
regarding funding and inmates, copies of any detention policies and procedures regarding 
immigration and immigration holds and inmates. 
11. Experts. The underlying facts or data that form the basis of any expert testimony 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 705. 
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY TO PLAINTIFF - 5 
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\ ' 
12. SOP Manual. The specific Standard Operating Procedures Manual the office~(s) 
followed when administering any field sobriety tests or blood alcohol tests. 
13. Brady Material. All exculpatory evidence favorable to the Defendant which is 
material either to guilt or punishment. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
The Defendant further requests this information, evidence and material, or permission to 
inspect and copy the information, evidence and materials, within FOURTEEN (14) days, unless 
it is given sooner at the offices of Davison, Copple, Copple, & Copple, 199 North Capitol 
Boulevard, Suite 600, Boise, Idaho. 
The Defendant reserves the right to make request for such other and additional discovery 
as may be determined at a later date. 
A 
DATED this )1 day of October, 2011. 
By: 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE 
Ed Guerricabeitia, of the firm 
Attorneys for Defendant 
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY TO PLAINTIFF - 6 
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' . 
' 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
.#.. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the :2~ day of October, 2011, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual, by the method 
indicated, and addressed as follows: 
Boise City Attorney's Office 
P.O. Box500 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500 
[v( 
[ ] 
[ ] 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile 
Ed Guerricabeitia 
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY TO PLAINTIFF - 7 
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ED GUERRICABEITIA 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE 
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza, Suite 600 
Attorneys at Law 
199 North Capitol Boulevard 
Post Office Box 1583 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-3658 
Facsimile: (208) 386-9428 
ISB No. 6148 
Attorneys for Defendant 
NO.:---""Cil'l;~~.,q..J_J __ 
A.M __ --FIL1~[;&1>:z=~· 
OCT 2 7 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Cieri< 
By AMY LANG 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KEVIN NICOLESCU, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076 
Citation No.: 1484104 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION FOR 
FILING PTR-TRIAL MOTIONS 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Kevin Nicolescu, by and through his attorney of record, 
Ed Guerricbaeitia of the firm Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple, of Boise, Idaho, and moves 
this Court, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rules, Rule 1 and Rule 12(d), for its Order extending the 
time for filing of pre-trial motions until twenty-eight (28) days following the State's complete 
compliance with its discovery obligations. This Motion is based on the fact that the 28-day rule 
of the Idaho Criminal Rules, Rule 12(d) has generally been formulated to apply in the District 
Court in felony cases after discovery has been fully completed in the Magistrate's Division. The 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION FOR FILING PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS -1 
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' . 
requested extension of time will allow the parties time to complete discovery and thus determine 
whether Rule 12 motions are needed in the above-entitled action. 
A. 
DATEDthis 27 dayof0ctober,2011. 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE 
By:~~ 
EdGUefrica citia)Ofthefu11 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
"" I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2r_ day of October, 2011, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual, by the method 
indicated, and addressed as follows: 
Boise City Attorney's Office 
P.O. Box500 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500 
[·~U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Facsimile 
Ed Guerricabeitia 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION FOR FILING PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS -2 
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ED GUERRICABEITIA 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE 
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza, Suite 600 
Attorneys at Law 
199 North Capitol Boulevard 
Post Office Box 1583 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-3658 
Facsimile: (208) 386-9428 
ISB No. 6148 
Attorneys for Defendant 
~~----F-IL~·~· L/:c:Jt 
OCT 3 1 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By ELAINE TONG 
DI!PUTY 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076 
Citation No.: 1484104 
DEFENDANT'S SECOND REQUEST 
FOR DISCOVERY TO PLAINTIFF 
KEVIN NICOLESCU, 
Defendant. 
TO: BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Kevin Nicolescu, by and through his counsel, and 
pursuant to I.C.R. 16, hereby requests discovery and inspection of all materials discoverable per 
I.C.R. 16 b (1-8), including but not limited to, the following: 
1. Reports of examinations and tests. Permit the Defendant to inspect and copy or 
photograph any results of reports of physical or mental examinations and of scientific 
tests or experiments made in connections with this particular case, or copies thereof, 
which are intended for use by the prosecutor as evidence at trial, pursuant to Rule 
DEFENDANT'S SECOND REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY TO PLAINTIFF - 1 
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16(b)(5). Without limiting the foregoing, Defendant requests copies of the following 
specific tests: 
A. A copy of the print-out from the breath test submitted by Defendant and 
administered by the Officer PRIOR to Defendant being played the advisory tape 
which informed Defendant of his consequences for refusal or failure of any 
evidentiary testing. 
B. A copy of the print-outs from the one (1) breath test administered prior to 
the subsequent two (2) test administered to the Defendant. 
2. Brady Material. All exculpatory evidence favorable to the Defendant which is 
material either to guilt or punishment. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
The Defendant further requests this information, evidence and material, or permission to 
inspect and copy the information, evidence and materials, within FOURTEEN (14) days, unless 
it is given sooner at the offices of Davison, Copple, Copple, & Copple, 199 North Capitol 
Boulevard, Suite 600, Boise, Idaho. 
The Defendant reserves the right to make request for such other and additional discovery 
as may be determined at a later date. 
DATED this 31st day of October, 2011. 
By: 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE 
Ed Guerricabeitia, of the firm 
Attorneys for Defendant 
DEFENDANT'S SECOND REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY TO PLAINTIFF - 2 
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.. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 31st day of October, 2011, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual, by the method 
indicated, and addressed as follows: 
Boise City Attorney's Office 
P.O. Box 500 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500 
[vJ 
[ ] 
[ ] 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile 
Ed Guerricabeitia 
DEFENDANT'S SECOND REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY TO PLAINTIFF -3 
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' ~ 
IN. THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICfRE,~'!fR1Cj1~ti~=£ 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COU~'y OF ADA 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION NOV 0 2 2011 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff. 
200 W. Front Street, Boise, Idaho 83702 ER 0 RICH Clerk ) CHRISTO~HERIN PENA ' 
vs. 
Kevin Michael Nicolescu 
1708 N 30th st 
Boise, ID 83703 
) y DEPUTY 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No: CR-MD-2011-0017076 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Defendant. ) --------~~~~-------------------
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
BC Pretrial Conference ... Monday, December 19, 2011 ... 02:15 PM 
Judge: John Hawley Jr. 
Jury Triai ... Friday, January 13, 2012 ... 08:15 AM 
Judge: John Hawley Jr. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the 
Court and on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows: 
Defendant: Mailed ____ Hand Delivered ___ 
Clerk ______ Date ___ _ 
Edward Joe Guerricabeitia 
PO Box 1583 
Boise ID 83701 
Private Counsel: Mailed X:. 1 Hand l?Ef,lliiyy~er~_ Clerk~ Date J..l.l.Q.r 
Prosecutor: lnterdepwtrJJental Mail f I'J(JLL 0 Ada}(Boise 0 Eagle 0 G.C. 0 Meridian 
Clet.J01V Date .:....;__:_:::::.....ot£?"-
Public Defender: Interdepartmental Mail __ __ 
Clerk Date ______ _ 
Other: ----------------
· Mailed,___ Hand Delivered __ 
Clerk ______ Date ______ _ 
Dated: 10/28/2011 
I 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
CHRISTOPH 
Clerk of the 
By: 
--~-~~~--------Deputy Clerk 
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RECEIVED 
OCT 2 7 2011 
Ada County Clerk 
N°·---~F=·IL"'=~o-~~..,..;zv""'7"'::~ 
A.M._,....__ _ _.P.M._.U-
NOV 0 3 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By DEIRDRE FINNEGAN 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KEVIN NICOLESCU, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076 
Citation No.: 1484104 
ORDER FOR EXTENSION FOR 
FILING PTR-TRIAL MOTIONS 
Based upon the Motion filed herewith and for good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED AND THIS DOES ORDER that the time for filing pre-trial motions has been 
extended to twenty-eight (28) days following the filing of the State's Response to Defendant's 
Request for Discovery. 
DATED this Q_ day of N/) c/ 2011. 
ORDER FOR EXTENSION FOR FILING PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS - 1 
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C:ARYB. COLAIANNI 
BOIS~~F~TY AJTORNEY 
Sarah .A. Millar _ 
rlflt'·' .· 
Assistant City Attorney 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
P.O. B6x 500 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500 
Telephone: (208) 384-3870 
Idaho State Bar No. 7439 
Ml -~ : A.M·-----iP.M,-=:2_, ...... __ 
NOV 04 ·2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By MAURA OLSON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST 
FOR DISCOVERY 
COMES NOW, the state ofldaho, by and through Sarah A. Millar, Assistant City 
Attorney, and submits the following Response to Request for Discovery: 
· · The State has complied with such request by furnishing the following information, 
. -
eviden~e,.and materials with the exception of witness and victim dates of birth, driver's license 
numbers and/or social security numbers: 
: ' ~~p~r:: . 
1. Copies of: 
Idaho State Police Forensic Services Certificate of Calibration for Instrument Serial No. 
L #90205665 
~ertificate of Analysis/Approval for Solution Lot #10802 and 10103 
Boise Police Department Officer Certification Records for the Intoxilyzer 5000 series 
or Lifeloc FC20 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY- 1 aw 
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!daho J:?rivers License Record( s) 
· DUI General Report DR# 125-026 
. Boise Police Department General Report DR# 125-026 
Boise Police Department Supplemental Report DR# 125-026 by Officer Palic 
Crime Scene Investigation Photo Log(s) 
Idaho Vehicle Collision Report. No. 125-026 
Lifeloc Technologies, Inc. test result(s) 
Boise Police Department Idaho Uniform Citation# 1484104 
NCIC-KQ 
2. Defendant advised of existence and allowed access to when available (for audio or 
video tapes, see paragraph #7): 
Intox 5000 series Instrument or Lifeloc FC20 Operations Log for Serial Number 
' 202056.65 
Audio Tape and/or Digital Audio Recording(s) 
-~= Ada County Dispatch Digital and/or Audio Recording 
Computer Aided Dispatch Report 
Photocopy ofphotograph(s) 
3. Results of examination and tests: 
Intoxilyzer Results: .1 03/.096 
4. The State intends to call as witnesses: 
Idaho State Police Forensic Lab Representative, PO Box 700, Meridian, ID 83680 
(208) 884-7170 
Rachel Cutler and/or Designee, Idaho State Police Forensic, Lab Representative, PO 
Box 700, Meridian, ID 83680 (208) 884-7170 
.. Cpl. L¥fY G. Moore Ada #433, Boise Police Department, 333 N. Mark Stall Place, 
Boise, ID 83704, (208) 570-6000 · 
~·Representative from Ada County Paramedics, PO Box 140209, Boise, ID 83714, 
-~'(208) 287-2962 
Greg Warner or designee, Ada County Sheriffs Office, Dispatch, 7200 Barrister, Boise, 
ID 83704, (208) 577-6790 ' 
Officer Josiah C. Ransom Ada #797, Boise Police Department, 333 N. Mark Stall 
Place, Boise, ID 83 704, (208) 570-6000 
Officer Nic Ellis Ada #836, Boise Police Department, 333 N. Mark Stall Place, Boise, 
ID 83704, (208) 570-6000 
Officer Jones, Boise Police Department, 333 N. Mark Stall Place, Boise, ID 83704, 
(208) 570-6000 
Representative of St. Alphonsus, 1055 N. Curtis Road, Boise, ID 83704, (208) 364-
3221 . 
Amanda Stacey Carlson, 4612 E Faith Ln, Boise, ID 83706, (208) 713-3470 
_ . Officer Chris Palic Ada #858, Boise Police Department, 333 N. Mark Stall Place, 
· ·;,.:Boise, :iD 83704, (208) 570-6000 
_ Karin Lynn Raffo, 207 North 4th Street, Boise, ID 83702, (208) 890-0595 
...,.#:\~' 
':>;!} • 
. .. .,... -
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Ismat Ahmadi, 110 E. 35th Street, Boise, ID 83714, (208) 908-1369 
Paul H. Davis, 5952 South Red Crest Avenue, Boise, ID 83704, no phone number 
available 
James F. Pollard, 705 Locust Street, Kimberly, ID 83341, (208) 293-2649 
Brian J. Avila, 10453 West Bear Lake Drive, Boise, ID 83709, (208) 539-5648 
And any other individuals identified in the discovery materials. 
5. The Idaho criminal history for Defendant and/or witness~s, if such history exists, can 
be found using the on-line Idaho Supreme Court Data Repository at: 
https:/ /www.idcourt. us 
.. 
6. There may be other relevant information or documents on this case contained in the 
Court file. 
7. If the citation and/or police report reflect the existence of audio or video recording(s), 
please email a request to BCAO@cityofboise.org including the case number and the 
name of the defendant OR contact the legal secretary for the undersigned to make 
arrangements to do one of the following: 
a) Have the digital audio tape sent electronically to a secure FTP program for 
you to download to your local machine. You will be notified via email when 
it is ready to download; 
b) Listen and/or view the audiotape, videotape, and/9r CD at the Boise City 
Attorney's office; 
c) Make or obtain a copy of the audio file, video file or compact disc at our 
office using our high-speed dubbing machine or downloading the file to a CD 
or USB drive. 
8. Intoxilyzer 5000 series or Lifeloc FC20 Maintenance Log and Records: 
a) Maintenance conducted on the instrument is noted on the Intox. 5000 series 
Instrument Operations Log or Lifeloc FC20 Log; no separate maintenance log is 
kept. All internal maintenance is reflected in a voluminous collection of 
maintenance documents; copies of said maintenance documents are kept at the 
"' Boise City Attorney's Office. Defense counsel may make arrangements to view 
s~d copies by contacting the handling attorney in this case. 
9. Documents Relating to the Intoxilyzer 5000 series Detecting Acetone or Other 
Interfering Substances: 
a) Please refer to the Idaho Intoxilyzer 5000 Series Reference Manual, pages 25 & 
29 for relevant information. See below for how to obtain said manuals. 
10. Intoxilyzer Manual and Lifeloc FC20 Manual: 
a) Manuals relating to the Intoxilyzer and the Lifeloc FC20 may be obtained via 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY- 3 aw 
'ff 
000026
) 
the Internet at http://www.isp.idaho.gov/forensic/certificates.html#CofA 
11. Certificate of Analysis for the Solution Lot: 
a) The Certificate of Analysis for the Solution Lot may also be found on the 
Idaho State Police Forensic Services website at: 
http:/ /www.isp.idaho. gov/forensic/ certificates.html#CofA 
b) For certificates that are not listed on the webpage, please contact Forensic 
Services at P.O. Box 700, Meridian, ID 83680-0700,208-884-7219. 
12. Alco-Sensor: 
a)'No similar records are maintained on the hand-held Alco-Sensor because the 
instrument is used merely to detect the presence of alcohol, not to obtain a 
specific BAC. 
13. Officer Certification and Training Records: 
a) The list containing officer certification information is attached hereto. Defense 
counsel may submit a specific written request to the POST Academy care of Trish 
Christy, 700 S. Stratford Drive, Meridian, Idaho 83642 for information regarding 
a specific officer's training history, including which year (color) of N.H.T.S.A. 
training manual was used and if/when the officer may have taken a refresher 
training. If counsel has questions regarding the request, they may contact Ms. 
Christy at 208-884-7253. 
14. The State recognizes its on-going duty to supplement this Response to Discovery 
should additional evidence relevant to this case arise. 
DATED this __3_ day ofNovember, 2011. 
Sarah A. Millar 
Assistant City Attorney 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY- 4 aw 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _.3_ day ofNovember, 2011, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Ed Guerricabeitia 
DAVISON COPPLE COPPLE & COPPLE 
Attorneys at Law 
PO Box 1583 
Boise, ID 83701 
INTERDEPARTMENT MAIL 
FACSIMILE 
HAND DELIVER 
US MAIL 
X ELECTRONIC to: guerricabeitia@davisoncopple.com 
funk@davisoncopple.com 
aynmcmill~n@davisoncopple.com 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY- 5 aw 
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CARY B. COLAIANNI 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY 
Sarah A. Millar 
Assistant City Attorney 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
P.O. Box 500 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500 
Telephone: (208} 384-3870 
Idaho State Bar No. 7439 
NDV 0~ .2011 
CHRISTOPHER 0 Al 
By MAURA OLSOCH, Cieri( 
DEPUTy N 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU, 
Defendant. 
' 1 
TO: E4, Guerricabeitia: 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned, pursuant to Rule 16 of the Idaho 
Criminal Rules, requests discovery and inspection of the following information, evidence and 
materials: 
1. DOCUMENTS AND TANGIBLE OBJECTS -- Books, papers, documents, 
photographs, tangible objects or copies or portions thereof, which are within the possession, 
' ' 
custody or control of the defendant, and which the defendant intends to introduce in evidence at 
trial. 
i REPORTS OF EXAMINATION AND TESTS-- Any results or reports of physical 
or ment,al. exami;:mtions and of scientific tests or experiments made in connection with this case, 
or copies thereof, within the p6ssession or control of Defendant, which 
''( : ' 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY- 1 aw 
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defendant intends to introduce in evidence at the trial, or which were prepared by a witness 
whom Defendant intends to call at the trial when the results or reports relate to testimony of the 
witness. 
3. DEFENSE WITNESSES - Name(s), address(es), and phone number(s) of any 
witnesses Defendant intends to call at trial. 
· 4. EXPERT WITNESSES- Name(s), address(es), and phone number(s) of any expert 
witness Defendant intends to call at trial. With respect to each expert witness, please provide a 
written summary describing the testimony the witness intends to introduce, including the 
witness's opinions, the facts and data for those opinions, and the witness's qualifications. 
The undersigned further requests permission to inspect and copy said information, 
evidence and materials prior to the 15th day of November, 2011, at a time and place mutually 
agreeable to the parties hereto. 
FURTHER, please take notice that the undersigned prosecutor, pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 19-519, demands the defendant to serve, within ten (10) days, upon the prosecutor, a 
written notice of defendant's intention to offer alibi. Such notice shall state the specific place or 
places at which the defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense and the 
names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom he intends to rely to establish such alibi. 
YOU ARE FURTHER notified of the requirement to disclose any additional witnesses 
promptly to the prosecutor named below as they become known to you. 
DATED this ___3_ day ofNovember, 2011. 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY- 2 
Sarah A. Millar 
Assistant City Attorney 
aw 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this __2_ day of November, 2011, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Ed Guerricabeitia 
DAVISON COPPLE COPPLE & COPPLE 
Attorneys at Law 
PO Box 1583 
Boise, ID 83701 
INTERDEP ARTMENT MAIL 
FACSIMILE 
HAND DELIVER 
US MAIL 
'x. ELECTRONIC to: guerricabeitia@davisoncopple.com 
funk@davisoncopple.com 
aynmcmillan@davisoncopple.com 
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000031
CARY B. COLAIANNI 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY 
Sarah A. Millar 
Assistant City Attorney 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
P.O. Box 500 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500 
Telephone: (208) 384-3870 
Idaho State Bar No. 7439 
NO·-----;;;~--,.p-=-­FtLEo A.M ____ IP.M.,--"-~--
NOV 1 ~ 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
ey ELAINE TONG 
OI!PUTV 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff, Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076 
v. 
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU, 
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW, the state of Idaho, by and through Sarah A. Millar, Assistant City 
Attorney, and submits the following Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery: 
The State has complied with such request by furnishing the following additional 
information, evidence, and/or materials: 
Any copies of additional breath testing results have been requested and will be 
forwarded via Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery when and if 
received. 
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY- 1 mas 
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DATED this ___j;Q_ day ofNovember, 2011. 
Sarah A. Millar 
Assistant City Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this .lQ__ day ofNovember, 2011, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Ed Guerricabeitia 
DAVISON COPPLE COPPLE & COPPLE 
Attorneys at Law 
PO Box 1583 
Boise, ID 83701 
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
FACSIMILE 
HAND DELIVER 
US MAIL 
_.KELECTRONIC to: 
! 
guerricabeitia@davisoncopple.com 
funk@davisoncopple.com 
aynmcmillan@davisoncopple.com 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO, ADA COUNTY, MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
PROBABLE CAUSE FORM 
STATE OF IDAHO 
PRosEcuToR ~ . Lw ~J._ . 
COMPLAINING WITNESS----------
JUDGE 
0 BIETER 0 MCDANIEL 
0 COMSTOCK 0 MINDER 
0 DAY 0 MORDEN 
0 DENNARD 0 SCHMIDT 
0 DUTCHER 0 SWAIN. 
0 GRANT 0 VEHLOW 
0 HANSEN 0 WATKINS 
0 HAY 
0 
~ HAWLEY 
COMMENTS 
CASE NO. MD·2011 • t101lcz 
CLERK D. Finne&ID 
DATE Jf I J(e I 2011 
TOXIMETER ----------
TAPE NO. HAWLEY IJ...-Jfo-/1 BEG8~3.E13 
ENoBL/9..5-/ 
STATUS 
cia P~ffi~.SWORN 
0 PC FOUND 
~ COMPLAINT SIGNED 
0 AMENDED COMPLAINT SIGNED 
0 NOPC FOUND 
0 EXONERATE BOND 
0 SUMMONS TO BE ISSUED 
0 WARRANT ISSUED 
0 BONO SET$ 
0 NO CONTACT 
O.R. # ---------
0 DISMISS CASE 
0 IN CUSTODY 
. -----·- ------- ... - ------------
·-- ·----
PROBABLE CAUSE FORM [REV 2·20011 · 
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CARY B. COLAIANNI 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY 
Sarah A. Miliar 
Assistant City Attorney 
( • l 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
P.O. Box 500 
Boise, Idaho 83 701-0500 
Telephone: (208) 384-3870 
Idaho Siate Bar No. 7439 
No. ___ Fii:ED~~-
A.M._ FILED c' A()· 
·-----!P.M 2 IV' 
NOV 1 6 201f 
CHRISTOPHER o. RICH, Clerk 
By STORMY McCORMACK 
DEPUTY 
IN;THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff, Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076' 
v. 
COMPLAINT 
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU, 
Defendant. 
-. ~ 
PERSONALLY APPEARED Before me this ~ day of N4 ~ ~\,t.N ' 2011, 
--~=-· _.::....Le~o_"f'_;ll..=--rrl....:· ______ ,, Assistant City Attorney, in the city of Boise, county of 
Ada, state of Idaho, who, being first duly s~orn, complains and says that Kevin Michael 
Nicolescu, on or about the 15th day of October, 2011, in the city of Boise, county of Ada, and 
state of Idaho, did commit the crime(s) of: DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS, a misdemeanor, which is a violation of Idaho Code § 18-
8004(1)(a), as follows~ to-wit: I 
COMPLAINT- 1 aw 
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, . 
I i • o 
COUNT I 
That the Defendant, Kevin Michael Niqolescu, on or about the 15th day of October, 2011, 
in the city of Boise, county of Ada, state of Idaho, did unlawfully drive or be in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property 
open to the public, to-wit: 1996 Nissan, at or about Idaho and 16th, while under the influence of 
alcohol and/or drugs, and/or with an alcohol concentration of .08 or more, as shown by analysis 
of blood, urine, or breath, which is in violation ofldaho Code§ 18-8004(1)(a). 
All of which is contrary to the form, force, and effect of the statute, and against the peace 
and dignity of the state ofldaho. 
Said Complainant therefore prays that the Defendant may be dealt with according to law. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this .J..h_ day of_,_}J__y_c,t),e..._..;.r/ _ , 2011. 
COMPLAINT- 2 aw 
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CARY B. COLAIANNI 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY 
Sarah A. Millar 
Assistant City Attorney 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
P.O. Box 500 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500 
Telephone: (208) 384-3870 
Idaho State Bar No. 7439 
:. ____ ALED_,>M s 
DEC 01 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk -
By MAURA OLSON 
DEPUTY· 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
-THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076 
v. 
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW, the state of Idaho, by and through Sarah A. Millar, Assistant City 
Attorney, and submits the following Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery: 
The State has complied with such request by furnishing the following additional 
information, evidence, and/or materials: 
1 : Disclosure of: 
Amended Complaint filed November 16,2011 
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r - A 
DATED this _8.o day of November, 2011. 
Sarah A. Millar 
Assistant City Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~V day of November, 2011, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Ed Guerricabeitia 
DA VISON,COPPLE COPPLE & COPPLE 
Attorneys at Law 
PO Box 1583 
Boise, ID 83701 
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
FACSIMILE 
HAND DELIVER 
US MAIL 
k ELECTRONIC to: guerricabeitia@davisoncopple.com 
funk@davisoncopple.com 
aynmcmillan@davisoncopple.com 
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ED GUERRICABEITIA 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE 
Attorneys at Law 
Chase Capitol Plaza, Suite 600 
199 North Capitol Boulevard 
Post Office Box 1583 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-3658 
Facsimile: (208) 386-9428 
ISB No. 6148 
Attorneys for Defendant 
DEC 02 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By MAURA OLSON 
DEPUlY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH WDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
*** 
Case No: CR-MD-2011-0017076 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Kevin Michael Nicolescu, by and through his attorney of 
record Ed Guerricabeitia of the firm Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple, of Boise, Idaho, and 
moves this Court to suppress any and all evidence obtained by Officer Palic of the Boise Police 
Department, in connection with the above captioned matter. Further, Defendant moves this 
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Court to grant a Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing. In support thereof, counsel sets forth the 
following: 
1. On October 15, 2011, the Defendant was involved in an accident in which 
he was hit by a driver running a red light at the intersection of Idaho and 
16th streets in Boise, Idaho. 
2. Officer Palic noticed that the Defendant smelled of alcohol, Defendant's 
eyes were bloodshot and glassy, and Defendant admitted to consuming 
alcohol that night for which Officer Palic requested Defendant perform a 
Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test. 
3. Officer Palic was unable to complete the HGN test because Defendant's 
left eye was bothering him and he felt like he had something in it. Officer 
Palic elected not to conduct any other Field Sobriety Tests. 
4. Officer Palic conducted a preliminary breath test on Mr. Nicolescu which 
resulted in a reading of .108. 
5. Ther~fter, Officer placed Defendant under arrest for driving under the 
influence. All RG-S~J> oe.. De. {A(I.)F:;-1> ? 
6. After placing Defendant under arrest, Mr. Nicolescu performed two breath 
tests of which the results were .103/.096. 
7. Officer Palic lacked the reasonable suspicion or probable cause necessary 
to arrest and request the Defendant to submit to evidentiary testing absent 
the result of the preliminary breath test. 
8. The Defendant has a right to a full evidentiary hearing on the Motion to 
Suppress evidence procured in violation of his constitutional rights. 
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WHEREFORE, the Defendant respectfully requests this Honorable Court to grant this 
Motion for full evidentiary hearing to suppress evidence obtained as a result of Officer Palic's 
lack of reasonable suspicion or probable cause for Defendant to submit to any evidentiary testing 
and subsequent arrest. 
DATED this 2nd day ofDecember, 2011. 
By: 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE 
Ed Guerricabeitia, of the firm 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2nd day of December, 2011, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual, by the method 
indicated, and addressed as follows: 
Boise City Attorney's Office 
P.O. Box 500 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500 
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U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
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Ed Guerricabeitia 
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ED GUERRICABEITIA 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE 
Attorneys at Law 
Chase Capitol Plaza, Suite 600 
199 North Capitol Boulevard 
Post Office Box 1583 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-3658 
Facsimile: (208) 386-9428 
ISB No. 6148 
Attorneys for Defendant 
:.: ":. 3~ 
DEC 02 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By MAURA OLSON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
*** 
Case No: CR-MD-2011-0017076 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
COMES NOW Defendant, Kevin Michael Nicolescu, by and through his counsel of 
record, Ed Guerricabeitia of the firm Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple and hereby submits his 
memorandum in support of his Motion to Suppress. 
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I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 15, 2011, at approximately 2:12 a.m., Officer Palic of the Boise Police 
Department responded to a car accident at the intersection of Idaho and 16th streets in Boise. 
Officer Palic made contact with Officer Ransom at the scene, who then directed him to Mr. 
Nicolescu. Mr. Nicolescu explained to Officer Palic that as he approached the intersection 
heading west with a green light he was hit by another driver from the north that ran a red light. 
During the contact, Officer Palic detected a strong odor of alcohol coming from Mr. 
~ . 
Nicolescu as he spoke. Officer Palic also noticed that Mr. Nicolescu had glassy or .. bloodshot 
eyes, but that he was not slurring his speech, and that he did not show any signs of memory 
impairment. When asked if he had consumed any alcohol, Mr. Nicolescu stated that he had 
consumed alcohol that night. 
At that point, Officer Palic asked Mr. Nicolescu to submit to a Horizontal Gaze 
Nystagmus (HGN) test. Mr. Nicolescu complied and Officer Palic began to administer the test, 
butthen h~d to stop the test because Mr. Nicolescu's left eye was bothering him from the debris 
and dust that got into it from when the airbag deployed and hit his face. Officer Palic elected not 
to conduct any other Field Sobriety Tests (FSTs) due to the collision and adrenaline setting in. 
' However, in order to substantiate his probable cause or reasonable suspicion to arrest Mr. 
Nicolescu, Officer Palic took a preliminary breath test, which is not authorized by statute. The 
preliminary breath test resulted in a reading of .108. Mr. Nicolescu was subsequently arrested 
for driving under the influence. After his arrest, Mr. Nicolescu provided two breath samples, the 
results ofwhich were .103/.096. 
II. ARGUMENT 
The officer did not have the necessary probable cause or reasonable suspicion to request 
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Mr. Nicolescu to submit to evidentiary testing to determine if he was driving under the influence 
absent the result of the preliminary breath test. Moreover, it was improper for the officer to 
require Mr. Nicolescu to submit to an evidentiary test (the preliminary breath test) in order to 
substantiate his probable cause or reasonable suspicion to arrest Mr. Nicolescu for driving under <.; 
the influence. Consequently, because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause to have Mr. Nicolescu submit to any evidentiary testing prior to the preliminary breath test, 
the results of the breath tests are the product of an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of 
Mr. Nicolescu's Fourth Amendment rights and should be suppressed. 
In light of the above Defendant respectfully requests that this Court GRANT Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to arrest Mr. 
Nicolescu for driving under the influence prior to the results of the preliminary 
evidentiary test, the results of the breath tests are the product of an unreasonable search 
and seizure in violation of Mr. Nicolescu's Fourth Amendment rights. 
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution forbids unreasonable searches and 
seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
The administration of a blood alcohol test constitutes a seizure of the person and 
a search within the purview of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1833-34, 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 917-18 
(1966); State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007);DeWitt, 145 Idaho at 711-
712, 184 P.3d at 217-18. 
The issue of whether an officer can require an individual to submit to a preliminary 
evidentiary test to substantiate probable cause or reasonable suspicion for an arrest is an issue of 
first impression. It is unclear what the standard is for an officer's arrest and administration of 
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evidentiary testing because the Courts in this state have yet to decide this issue. 
Although Idaho Courts have yet to determine the proper standard, whether it is 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause, for an officer to arrest a suspect and request a breath test, 
it appears that the standard for arrest and evidentiary testing is something more than reasonable 
suspicion. 
In Thompson v. State, 135 Idaho 512, 515, 65 P.3d 534, 537 (Ct. App. 2003), the Idaho 
Court of Appeals stated that it is not clear that probable cause is the correct standard for an 
officer to arrest a suspect and request a breath test, even though the defendant and the state 
agreed that it was the applicable prerequisite. Because the higher standard of probable cause was 
satisfied in this instance, the Court of Appeals declined to resolve the issue. Probable cause 
existed here where the officer observed the defendant speeding, detected a strong odor of alcohol 
on his breath, observed bloodshot eyes and dilated pupils, was aware that the defendant refused 
to take field sobriety tests, and had reason to believe the defendant lied when he stated that he 
had not been drinking. Collectively, these circumstances supported the officer's reasonable 
belief that the defendant was driving while under the influence. Id 
The Court of Appeals further stated in Thompson that its decision in State v. Ferreira, 
133 Idaho 474, 988 P.2d 700 (Ct. App. 1999), where it held that officers may administer field 
sobriety tests based on reasonable suspicion, suggests that the lesser standard of reasonable 
suspicion may suffice for an officer's arrest and administering of evidentiary tests. Id. However, 
field sobriety tests and evidentiary tests are not synonymous. An evidentiary test is the testing of 
blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the presence of intoxicating substances in a 
person. I.C. § 18-8002A(e). Since the lesser standard applies to field sobriety tests, it appears 
that something more than reasonable suspicion is required for an officer to arrest and administer 
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evidentiary testing. 
Probable cause is based on the totality ofthe circumstances. The Supreme Court of Idaho 
has stated: 
I 
When reviewing an officer's actions the court must judge the facts against an objective 
standard. That is, '\xould the :facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or 
search warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was 
appropriate." Because the facts making up a probable cause determination are viewed 
from an objective standpoint, the officer's subjective beliefs concerning that 
determination are not material. 
State v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 136-37, 922 P.2d 1059, 1062-63 (1996). 
Reasonable suspicion requires less than probable cause, but more than mere speculation 
or instinct on the part of the officer. State v. McCarthy, 133 Idaho 119, 124, 982, P.2d 954, 959 
(Ct. App. 1999). Reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances and "must 
yield a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the individual being stopped is or 
has been engaged in wrongdoing." State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 963, 88 P.3d 780, 782 
(Ct. App. 2004). 
Generally, cases in Idaho that involve probable cause for arrest or reasonable suspicion to 
perform field sobriety tests require more evidence that just the odor of alcohol, admission of 
drinking or bloodshot eyes as evidence of alcohol or drug use. See State v. Finnicum, 14 7 Idaho 
137, 140, 206 P.3d 501, 504 (Ct. App. 2009) (concluding that probable cause existed to arrest the 
defendant who smelled strongly of alcohol, slurred her speech, has glassy and bloodshot eyes, 
seemed confused, and failed the field sobriety tests); State v. Buell, 145 Idaho 54, 175 P.3d 216 
(Ct. App. 2008) (probable cause existed for arrest where defendant lost footing when exiting 
vehicle, admitted to consuming alcohol, and failed field sobriety tests); State v. Zubizareta, 122 
Idaho 823, 828, 839 P.2d 1237, 1242 (Ct. App. 1992) (concluding that probable cause existed to 
arrest the defendant where the defendant had difficulty speaking and standing, he smelled of 
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alcohol, he had watery eyes, urine-soaked trousers, an agitated attitude, and failed field sobriety 
tests). 
Moreover, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that a positive HGN test in conjunction 
with other field sobriety tests may supply probable cause for arrest, but standing alone does not 
provide proof positive of driving under the influence of alcohol. State v. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 
811 P.2d 488 (1991); cf State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 988 P.2d 700 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(defendant failed HGN test, one-leg stand test, and heel-toe walking test). 
Here, based on the totality of the circumstances, the officer did not have the requisite 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause for Mr. Nicolescu's arrest absent the results of the 
preliminary breath test. Even if the officer only needed to satisfy the lesser standard, reasonable 
suspicion, in order to arrest Mr. Nicolescu and administer evidentiary testing, the statute does not 
authorize administering a preliminary evidentiary test in order to substantiate probable cause to 
arrest and administer more evidentiary tests. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause must exist 
before an officer may arrest and administer evidentiary tests. 
The officer here detected the odor of alcohol on Mr. Nicolescu's breath, and Mr. 
Nicolescu admitted to drinking alcohol that night. Mr. Nicolescu was not slurring his speech, 
and did not show signs of impaired memory. The officer performed an HGN test on Mr. 
Nicolescu but was unable to finish because Mr. Nicolescu's eyes were bothering him. Mr. 
Nicolescu had just been in a collision accident, of which he was not at fault for, and debris had 
gotten into his eyes which likely was the reason that Mr. Nicolescu's eyes appeared bloodshot to 
the officer. The officer, not Mr. Nicolescu, elected not to continue performing the other field 
sobriety tests. At this point, the officer did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to 
arrest Mr. Nicolescu. It was then that the officer administered the preliminary breath test, which 
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is not authorized by statute. 
Therefore, it appears that the officer improperly administered the preliminary breath test 
for the sole purpose of substantiating his reasonable suspicion or probable cause to arrest Mr. 
Nicolescu for driving under the influence. To allow officers to administer a preliminary 
evidentiary test in order to substantiate reasonable suspicion or probable cause would result in 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause never being necessary in order to arrest and then 
administer evidentiary testing. Officers, on mere hunches, suspecting an individual is operating 
a vehicle under the influence could simply demand the individual to submit to a preliminary 
breath test to form the officer's reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Field Sobriety Tests 
would be irrelevant, and if administered would result in biased observations of officers to 
support an arrest. 
The practice of administering a preliminary evidentiary test creates a slippery slope 
between an individual's constitutional rights and the state's legitimate interest for the safety of 
others, which practice can be fraught with abuse by officers. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The officer did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause for arrest prior to the 
preliminary breath test. Consequently, the results of the breath tests are the product of an 
unreasonable search and seizure in violation of Mr. Nicolescu's Fourth Amendment rights and 
should be suppressed. 
The Defendant respectfully requests that this Court suppress any and all evidence derived 
from the unconstitutional search and seizure. 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE-- 7 
000048
DATED this 2nd day ofDecember, 2011. 
By: 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE 
£{/~~~~ 
ED GUERRICABEITIA, ofthe firm 
Attorneys for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2nd day of December, 2011, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual, by the method 
indicated, and addressed as follows: 
Boise City Attorney's Office 
P.O. Box500 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500 
[a/'] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Facsimile 
~~ 
Ed Guerricabeitia 
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\ 
ED GUERRICABEITIA 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE 
Attorneys at Law 
Chase Capitol Plaza, Suite 600 
199 North Capitol Boulevard 
Post Office Box 1583 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-3658 
Facsimile: (208) 386-9428 
ISB No. 6148 
Attorneys for Defendant 
No. ___ ---;i:ii'i:n---:~-~~~ 
A.M ____ F_I~~~ ~3 ~ LA,d 
DEC -5 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By ELAINE TONG 
DSPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF ADA, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No: CR-MD-2011-0017076 
AFFIDAVIT OF KEVIN MICHAEL 
NICOLESCU IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
I am over the age of 18 years old and make this Affidavit based upon my own personal 
knowledge. 
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.. 
On October 15, 2011, I was driving my vehicle when I was involved in a car accident. I 
was going through a green light at the intersection of Idaho and 16th streets in Boise, Idaho, when 
another driver heading the opposite direction ran a red light and collided with my vehicle. At the 
time of the collision, my driver side airbag deployed and struck me in the face. The dust from 
the deployment of my air bag got into my eyes. 
An officer by the name of Palic approached me and started talking to me. The officer 
asked if I had anything to drink, and I told him that I had consumed some alcohol that night. The 
officer performed the eye test on me but was unable to finish because my eye was bothering me 
from the debris and dust that got into it from when the airbag deployed and hit my face. 
The officer decided not to perform any other Field Sobriety Tests on me, but gave me a 
breath test. After he got the results from that first breath test he arrested me and then I performed 
two more breath tests. 
DATED this ~ay of December, 2011. 
-• KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO Before e is~ day o~~{ 'd-Q)l~ 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho / I 
My Commission Expires: \, (;l ( (o 
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' . .. . 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 5th day of December, 2011 I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual, by the method 
indicated, and addressed as follows: 
Boise City Attorney's Office 
P.O. Box500 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500 
[ vf U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Facsimile 
E uerr1ca e1t1a 
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NO.------:::F,;;-:::L~~.~-:-~::;-/-=-:z~::z--A.M., ____ , -V-
DEC 1 9 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By DEIRDRE FINNEGAN 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ADA COUNTY, MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. (12-.11/J-c;}ol/- ool7of(, 
----=-J(p;.!.J...e~v./.:..L.n __,jL-)/;.!.1..>("-'-1.4=J~M~~~~v!...:::..:l'.scy~--· ~ 
PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM 
AND MINUTE ENTRY 
~hambers 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
_________________________ ) 
Appearances: D AC _M BC D EC D GC D MC Prosecutor ~ / kr 
Defense Counsel £4 GLA..err. (qSft -f!<. Interpreter---------
D Jury trial waived and case is to be re-set for court trial. 
D Plea and sentence via Defense Counsel authorized by Defendant: Rule 6(d), IMR 
and/or IIR. 
D Pre-trial motions, timely filed, are set for hearing on---------' at 
--,---- __ .m. 
D Case is re-set for ------------at __________ .m. 
D Defendant failed to appear. Absence not explained, justified, or excused. 
Trial date vacated. Bond forfeited/ROR revoked. Bench Warrant issued. 
Bond set at$ __ .,---______ _ 
~ Other: ,W J/uf;~(l fa S:ppleSS Ctrtj re..:f)clec!uk !Tc 
Dated this /Cj .A day of Oete11~r 
::==bsJY) 0 ~ 
Defendant 
Address: 
Telephone: --::=-------------
DE Clerk: 
PRE-TRIAL MEMORANDUM AND MINUTE ENTRY [Rev 11-2010] 
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NO.Iiir1"1\"'"""!:iiii:n----
: A.M. H ~9~ FIL~M. 
----
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT&(; Tfif' 2011 STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
200 W. Front Street, Boise, Idaho 83702 By ANNA MORGAN 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff. 
) DEPUTY 
vs. 
Kevin Michael Nicolescu 
1708 N 30th st 
Boise, I D 83703 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendant. ) --------~~~~-------------------
Case No: CR-MD-2011-0017076 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Motion ... Tuesday, February 14, 2012 ... 03:30 PM 
Judge: John Hawley Jr. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the 
Court and on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows: 
Defendant: Mailed Hand Delivered __ 
Clerk ____ Date __ _ 
Edward Joe Guerricabeitia 
POBox1583 ~ 
Boise ID 83701 ~ /
Private Counsel: Mailed Py-=_ Hand f~vi::::::;6,..._ Signature .... ~=-="-'--...;..._/-4-'/.....:::l<:;.o:;;..;..o"'---=:..........;=::;;.._ 
Clerk ~ Date l I Phone .l.....--L-----------
Prosecutor: lnterdep~ental Mail 'fJ DAda ~oise DEagle D G.C. D Meridian 
Clerk ~ Date bl~-\ I 
Public Defender: Interdepartmental Mail __ 
Clerk Date ___ _ 
Other: ------------
Mailed Hand Delivered __ 
Clerk ____ Date ___ _ 
Dated: 12/19/2011 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the Court 
DetCferk By:~.
000054
ED GUERRICABEITIA 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE 
Attorneys at Law 
Chase Capitol Plaza, Suite 600 
199 North Capitol Boulevard 
Post Office Box 1583 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-3658 
Facsimile: (208) 386-9428 
ISB No. 6148 
Attorneys for Defendant 
~.~.-,_ ------------71F-Iii:L~.n~.~e>~;"~'t~5~ 
JAN 2 4 2012 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By ELAINE TONG 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH ruDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
*** 
Case No: CR-MD-2011-0017076 
STIPULATION TO CONTINUE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SCHEDULED 
ON FEBRUARY 14, 2012 
COME NOW the Defendant, Kevin Michael Nicolescu, by and through his attorney of 
record Ed Guerricabeitia of the firm Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple, of Boise, Idaho, and 
Plaintiff, State of Idaho, by and through its attorneys of record, Michael Dean of the Boise City 
Prosecutor's Office and hereby stipulate and agree to continue the pending Motion for 
STIPULATION TO CONTINUE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SCHEDULED ON 
FEBRUARY 14, 2012- 1 
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Suppression scheduled on February 14, 2012 to a new date and time convenient for the Court 
and parties on the grounds that Defendant's counsel has a three (3) day jury trial beginning on 
February 13, 2012 in the District Court in Canyon County. 
Defendant counsel's has no unavailable dates in March 2012. 
DATED this 2-1./h day of January, 2012. 
By: 
DATED this_ day of January, 2012. 
By: 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE 
Ed Guerricabeitia, of the firm 
Attorneys for Defendant 
BOISE CITY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
Michael Dean, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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01/24/2012 10:14 FAX Boise City A tty ~ 003/003 
01-20-12;12:47~M: ;20B aae 942a • 3/ ~ 
Suppression scheduled on February 14, 2012 to a new date and time convenient for the Court · 
and parties on the grounds that Defendant's counsel has a thr~e (3) day jury trial beginning on. 
February 13, 2012 in the District Court in Canyon County. 
Defendant counsel's has no unavailable dates in March 2012. 
DATED this_ day of January~ 2012. 
By; 
DATED this tl day of January~ 2012. 
By: 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE 
Ed Guerricabeitia, of the firm 
Attorneys for Defendant 
~'SOFFICE 
., 
\ 
c--_--.._ .  ;;,...;;;;___~ 
Michael Dean, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
STIPULATION TO CONTINUE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SCHEDULED ON 
FEBRUARY 14, 2012-2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
fo 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day of January, 2012, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual, by the method 
indicated, and addressed as follows: 
Boise City Attorney's Office 
P.O. Box500 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500 
[vf 
[ ] 
[ ] 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile 
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FEBRUARY 14, 2012- 3 
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--. ,_ 
ED GUERRICABEITIA 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE 
Attorneys at Law 
Chase Capitol Plaza, Suite 600 
199 North Capitol Boulevard 
Post Office Box 1583 
RECE\VED 
JAN '! ~ ?.tl\'1. 
'NO. 
A.M-. 82"'7;;:7.~~'r"":F:;o::"IL~:::::::~----
F:EB '0 6 2012 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By DEIRDRE FINNEGAN 
DEPUTY 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-3658 
Facsimile: (208) 386-9428 CO
UNT'< CLERK ADA 
ISB No. 6148 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
*** 
Case No: CR-MD-2011-0017076 
ORDER TO CONTINUE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SCHEDULED 
ON FEBRUARY 14, 2012 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court on the parties' Stipulation for 
Continuance, and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the hearing currently set for February 14, 2012, is 
vacated and will be continued on the L2- day of ttpc; \ , 2012. 
ORDER TO CONTINUE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SCHEDULED ON 
FEBRUARY 14, 2012- 1 
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DATED thiblkday of January, 2012. 
By: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __ day of January, 2012, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual, by the method 
indicated, and addressed as follows: 
Boise City Attorney's Office [ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
P.O. Box 500 [ ] Hand Delivered 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500 [ ] Facsimile 
Ed Guerricabeitia [ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Davison & Copple [ ] Hand Delivered 
P.O. Box 1583 [ ] Facsimile 
Boise, ID 83701 
Clerk of the Court 
ORDER TO CONTINUE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SCHEDULED ON 
FEBRUARY 14, 2012-2 
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IN THE DISTRICT ,COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL m~~ o~Jfrlr.I.._E __ _ 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA O 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION FEB 8 2012 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff. 
200 W. Front Street, Boise, Idaho 83702cHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
) By ERIN PENA 
) DEPUTY 
vs. 
Kevin Michael Nicolescu 
1708 N 30th st 
Boise, ID 83703 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendant. ) --------~~~==-------------------
Case No: CR-MD-2011-0017076 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Motion ... Friday, April13, 2012 ... 09:30 AM 
Judge: John Hawley Jr. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the 
Court and oh file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows: 
Defendant: Mailed Hand Delivered __ _ 
Clerk ____ Date __ _ 
Edward Joe Guerricabeitia 
PO Box 1583 
Boise ID 83701 
Private Counsel: 
Prosecutor: 
Mailed \ / () A Han~r.edt 
Clerk ~atUAJLU 15 Phone .l....--.....1.-------------
Ada Vsoise DEagle D G.C. D Meridian 
Public Defender: Interdepartmental Mail __ 
Clerk Date ___ __ 
Other: ------------
Mailed Hand Delivered. __ 
Clerk ____ Date ___ _ 
Dated: 2/6/2012 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
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CARY B. COLAIANNI 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY 
Andrea D. Carroll . 
Assistant City Attorney 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
P.O. Box 500 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500 
Telephone: (208) 384-3870 
Idaho State Bar No. 7763 
~~-----F-1~.~ 1;t 
APR -6 2012 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By ELAINE TONG 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_______________________________________________________________ ) 
Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO THE 
SUPPRESSION OF LIFELOC BREATH 
TEST RESULTS 
COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through Andrea D. Carroll, Assistant City 
Attorney, and hereby objects to the Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 15, 2011, Officer Chris Palic responded to the intersection of Idaho and 16th 
streets in Boise, Ada County, Idaho in reference to a vehicle collision with injuries. While the 
officer spoke with Kevin Nicolescu, one of the identified.drivers involved in the collision, he 
noticed the strong odor of alcohol and also noticed that his eyes were red, bloodshot and watery. 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO THE SUPPRESSION OF LIFELOC BREATH TEST RESULTS -
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Additionally, the Defendant admitted to consuming alcohol that night. Officer Palic attempted to 
conduct field sobriety tests on the Defendant. The officer first attempted to conduct the 
horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test, and scored the Defendant 4 of 6 points but did finish the 
test due to an injury to the Defendant's left eye that was incurred as part of the accident. The 
Defendant complained that his adrenaline was kicking in and the officer could see that the 
Defendant's legs were beginning to shake and the Defendant was very unsteady on his feet. Due 
to these factors, the Officer did not continue with additional field sobriety tests. Tl:le officer 
asked the Defendant to submit to an initial breath test on a machine known as an AlcoSensor. 
The Defendant's results were .108. Based on all of this information, the officer asked the 
Defendant to listen to the ALS advisory tape, observed the Defendant for the required 15 minute 
waiting period, then had the Defendant submit to additional breath tests on the LifeLoc portable 
breath test instrument resulting in .103 and .096 BrAC. The Defendant was at no time arrested. 
After the breath test results he was cited for driving under the influence and transported to Saint 
Alphonsus for medical treatment. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The correct standard for detaining. a suspect for additional questioning and 
investigation prior to an arrest is reasonable suspicion. 
The Defendant argues that the case law requires probable cause prior to having a suspect 
submit to an evidentiary test. However, careful review of the relevant case law reveals that any 
requirements for probable cause are more related to facts in those cases where a defendant is 
cuffed and transported to a new location to submit to the additional evidentiary test. The fact 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO THE SUPPRESSION OF LIFELOC BREATH TEST RESULTS-
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that is legally relevant to requiring an elevated standard is whether an arrest has happened or not. 
That is simply not at issue in this case when the suspect was detained on site only, was never 
transported to any location for the purpose of further investigation, and was merely cited, riot 
arrested. 
The Fourth Amendment, as well as the Idaho Constitution, require that all searches and 
seizures be reasonable. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37, 121 S. Ct. 447,451, 148 
L.Ed.2d 333, 340 (2000); State v. Metzger, 144 Idaho 397, 399, 162 P.3d 776, 778 (Ct. App. 
2007); State v. Murphy, 129 Idaho 861, 863, 934 P.2d 34, 36 (Ct. App. 1997). Warrantless 
searches and seizures are considered unreasonable per se unless they come within one of the few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. California v. 
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1991, 114 L.Ed.2d 619, 634 (1991); State v. 
Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 295, 756 P.2d 1057, 1059 (1988); Metzger, 144 Idaho at 399, 162 
P .3d at 778. When a private vehicle is stopped by the police, the occupants are "seized" for the 
purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 
168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007); State v. Nevarez, 147 Idaho 470, 210 P.3d 578 (Ct. App. 2009). 
In order for an investigatory stop to be "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment, an 
officer must have reasonable suspicion that the person stopped has committed or is about to 
commit a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1882, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 908-09 
(1968). The reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause but more than mere 
speculation or instinct on the part of the officer. State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 483, 988 P.2d 
700, 709 (Ct. App. 1999). 
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An officer may draw reasonable inferences from the facts in his or her possession, and 
those inferences may be drawn from the officer's experience and law enforcement training. State 
v. Montague, 114 Idaho 319, 321, 756 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Ct. App. 1988). At the conclusion of an 
investigatory stop, an officer's suspicions may or may not prove to be correct. "[I]n order to 
satisfy the 'reasonableness' requirement of the Fourth Amendment, what is generally demanded 
of the many factual determinations that must r~gularly be made by agents of the government ... is 
not that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable." Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 
U.S. 177, 185, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 2800, 111 L.Ed.2d 148, 159 (1990). The reasonableness of the 
suspicion must be evaluate,d upon the totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop. 
Ferreira, 133 Idaho at 483, 988 P.2d at 709. 
The reasonable suspicion standard develops from case law separately from the probable 
cause standard. Probable cause to arrest a suspect exists "where the facts and circumstances 
within the officer's knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are 
sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed or is 
committing an offense." Thompson v. State, 138 Idaho 512, 515, 65 P.3d 534, 537 (Ct. App. 
2003) (citing Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228, 112 S.Ct. 534, 536-37 116 L.Ed.2d 589, 595-
96 (1991)). 
The Defendant cites to Thompson in support of his argument that probable cause is the 
correct standard required prior to requiring a suspect to submit to an evidentiary test. The one 
thing that is clear from reading that case, though, is that the Court did not rule on the matter. 
Additionally, the Court illustrated that the issue was one nuanced in the statutory interpretation 
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pver Idaho Code§ 18-8002(4)(b) in its use of the phrase "legal cause." Thompson at 515, 65 
P.3d at ~37. That statute is not at issue in this case, though, because the statute concerns the 
suspension of a drivers license for refusing to take a test. There was no alleged refusal in this 
case, so there is no need for the court to go into the nuanced analysis that the Thompson case did 
regarding the meaning of the phrase "legal cause." 
If the Court is to consider the Thompson case for guidance, the court was careful to note 
in its decision that in Ferreira, the court required a reasonable suspicion standard. !d. The 
Thompson court distinguished the facts from that in Ferreira, noting ~hat in Ferreira the facts did 
not involve "transporting an individual to a law enforcement building or hospital for breath, 
urine or bl9od testing." !d. This case is like Ferreira, not Thompson, in that there was no 
transportation of the Defendant to a new location for an evidentiary test, which is more likely to 
require an arrest of the individual. In this case, there was no transportation of the Defendant nor 
was there an arrest. 
Based on the above analysis, the State asks the Court to use a "reasonable suspicion" 
standard in its review of the facts of the case. 
B. In this case, the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain the Defendant. 
In this case, the officer had made observations that the Defendant had strong odor of 
alcohol and also noted that his eyes were red, bloodshot and watery. Additionally, the Defendant 
admitted. to consuming alcohol that night. The officer did not continue administration of the 
field sobriety tests after observing that the Defendant's injuries were compromising the tests and 
potentially posing a safety issue for the Defendant in performing the tests. 
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The officer responsibly altered the approach of his investigation to respond to unique 
' facts and circumstances. If the Defendant had performed and failed the field sobriety tests, the 
Defendant would be arguing that the injuries obviously compromised the officer's ability to rely 
on the results. If the officer had administered the field sobriety tests and the Defendant injured 
himself trying to perform the tests, the Defendant would be arguing the officer's actions in 
following a prescribed formula that no longer made sense under the circumstances was 
irresponsible and neglient. In this case, the officer did the only thing he could do under the 
circumstances. He adminis!ered an AlcoSensor test, a preliminary investigatory test analogous 
to a NIK test used for the purpose of investigation possession of a controlled substance, to 
determine if further detainment of the suspect was necessary. While the AlcoSensor test might 
not meet the statutory requirements for admission of a breath test at trial under 18-8004(4), the 
AlcoSensor, like other preliminary tests, play an important role in aiding an officer in decisions 
of whether to extend his detainment of an individual for additional testing. 
· At the time the officer asked for the Defendant to blow into the LifeLoc instrument, the 
State had both reasonable suspicion as well as probable cause to make an arrest. However, the 
correct standard for justifying temporary detainment is reasonable suspicion. It is only unless 
there is going to be an arrest that probable cause is required. In this case, since there was no 
arrest, the Court need only find that the officer had reasonable suspicion to fmd the detainment 
justified and the evidence obtained therefrom admissible. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this Sday of April, 2012, I serVed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Ed Guerricabeitia 
DAVISON COPPLE COPPLE & COPPLE 
Attorneys at Law 
PO Box 1583 
Boise, Idaho 83701 hsMAIL 
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
FACSIMILE 
_' HAND DELIVER 
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By DEIRDRE FINNEGAN 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ADA COUNTY, MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
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vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Cqse No. /[p1{ - \ 10 J (e 
-~f\if-+f\'~C001-\Ji\.Q~~~'-+9 -~-Ke~'A~Ji~ni:---.l 
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0 Jury trial waived and case is to be re-set for court trial. 
D Plea and sentence via Defense Counsel authorized by Defendant: Rule 6(d), IMR 
and/or IIR. 
D Pre-trial motions, timely filed, are set for hearing on---------' at 
....,....-------·m. 
D Case is re-set for ----------at ______ .m. 
D Defendant failed to appear. Absence not explained, justified, or excused. 
Trial date vacated. Bond forfeited/ROR revoked. Bench Warrant issued. 
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Dated this 1.3 .dayof. ~ J 
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IN THE DISTRICT~COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DI'STRIG.Jb...-.O..;..F...;.T.;;..;;H=E--:::":"=----
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF AD~.M. ____ F'L~~.~----
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
200 W. Front Street, Boise, Idaho 83702 
) 
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APR 1 6 2012 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By JUSTIN VOLLE 
DEPUTY ) ) 
) 
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Case No: CR-MD-2011-0017076 
Kevin Michael Nicolescu 
1708 N 30th st NOTICE OF HEARING 
Boise, ID 83703 
Defendant. ) 
-----------------------------------
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Motion ... Monday, June 11, 2012 ... 03:30 PM 
Judge: John Hawley Jr. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the 
Court and on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows: 
Defendant: Mailed Hand Delivered __ __ 
Clerk _______ Date __ _ 
Edward Joe Guerricabeitia 
PO Box 1583 
Boise ID 83701 
Private Counsel: Mailed t£ Hand~~e0ptX. Clerk Date Phone ~~-------------------
Prosecutor: Interdepartmental Mail ex(_ D Adatm.ftoise D Eagle D G. C. D Meridian 
ClerkVL: Date Lt??P . 
Public Defender: Interdepartmental Mail __ __ 
Clerk Date ___ __ 
Other: ------------
Mailed Hand Delivered. __ __ 
Clerk _______ Date _____ _ 
Dated: 4/13/2012 CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
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STATE OF IDAHO, 
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Case No: CR-MD-2011-0017076 
Kevin Michael Nicolescu 
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NOTICE OF HEARING 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Motion ... Monday, July 02, 2012 ... 03:30 PM 
· Judge: John Hawley Jr. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the 
Court and on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows: 
Defendant: Mailed Hand Delivered __ __ 
Clerk ____ Date ___ _ 
Edward Joe Guerricabeitia 
PO Box 1583 
Boise ID 83701 
Private Counsel: 
Prosecutor: 
Maile~~ Hand Delivered=--_ 
Clerk W!F- d Date (.C2 -15 
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Public Defender: Interdepartmental Mail __ 
Clerk Date ___ _ 
Other: ------------
Mailed Hand Delivered __ 
Clerk ____ Date ___ _ 
Dated: 6/14/2012 CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL ~~"iOOHER D. RICH, Clerk ~Yo'E~DRE FINNEGAN 
DEPUTY 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
) Case No. CR-MD-2011- 17076 
) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
) REGARDING MOTION 
) TO SUPPRESS 
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
APPEARANCES: Andrea Carroll, Assistant Boise City Prosecuting Attorney 
Ed Guerricabeitia, Attorney for Defendant 
I.FACTUALANDPROCEDURALBACKGROUND 
On October 15, 2011 Defendant, Kevin M. Nicolescu (Nicolescu) was involved in 
a two vehicle collision at the intersection of Idaho and 161h streets in Boise, Idaho. Boise 
City Police Officer Ransom responded to the scene. Officer Chris Palic of the Boise City 
Police Department then arrived on the scene and was directed to speak with Nicolescu. 
Nicolescu informed Officer Palic that he had proceeded through a green light west 
bound on Idaho Street when the other vehicle northbound on 16th Street apparently ran a 
red light and collided with his vehicle. While speaking with Nicolescu, Officer Palic 
detected a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage. In addition, Officer Palic noted that 
Nicolescu had red, bloodshot and watery eyes. There was no indication of slurred speech 
or impaired memory. There were some minor cuts and abrasions to Nicolescu's face, 
which Palic assumed were caused by the deployment of the airbag during ~e collision. 
Nicolescu agreed to speak with Palic. 
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Nicolescu admitted that he had consumed alcohol earlier that evening. Officer 
Palic requested Nicolescu submit to a Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test. After 
starting the HGN test, Officer Palic had scored Nicolescu with 4 of 6 decision points, but 
did not complete the test due to an injury to Nicolescu's left eye which had occurred as a 
result of the accident. Nicolescu then indicated that his adrenaline was kicking in and 
Officer Palic observed Nicolescu's legs shaking and that he was unsteady on his feet. 
Palic discussed his observations with Officer Larry Moore, who was also on the 
scene. Palic explained to Moore that he had observed a strong odor of alcohol, glassy 
bloodshot eyes, that Nicolescu had scored 4 of 6 decision points on the HGN (which 
would have been a failure) prior to terminating the test and that Nicolescu admitted he 
had consumed alcohol earlier that evening. The watery bloodshot eyes could have been 
caused by debris from the airbag deploying in the accident and it is also possible they 
resulted from Nicolescu consuming alcohol or even a combination of both factors. Palic 
explained that he did not want to perform other FSTs because Nicolescu was visibly 
shaken by the accident. 
Palic was not aware of any traffic infractions or driving pattern because his only 
contact with Nicolescu was after the accident. Palic testified that he felt that he had 
enough information to arrest Nicolescu for suspicion of DUI. Palic testified that based on 
the totality of circumstances he told Officer Moore that he felt Nicolescu was not safe to 
operate a motor vehicle. Officer Moore, who had witnessed the discussion between Palic 
and Nicolescu, agreed that Palic should continue his investigation to determine if 
Nicolescu was safe to operate a motor vehicle or whether he might be under the influence 
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of alcohol. Paramedics on the scene examined Nicolescu and noted that he had a 
scratched cornea. 
Thereafter, Officer Palic told Nicolescu that he was not going to continue the 
HGN test because of the eye injury and because Nicolescu was shaken up. 1 
Palic then stated: "What I am going to have you do is blow into a device 
[AlcoSensor] and we'll just go from there. O.K. and we'll go from there. And I will 
make my determination from there." 
Nicolescu replied: "Dude I'm willing to cooperate however." 
Palic stated: "It will be a lot easier to do it this way, O.K." 
There was no audible response by Nicolescu and Palic then continued by 
explaining that Nicolescu would need to make a tight seal around the pipe and blow real 
hard. 
Nicolescu submitted to the preliminary breath test on the Alco-Sensor, which is a 
handheld breath alcohol tester. The Alco-Sensor is not certified and is not performance 
verified. It is used to detect the presence of alcohol in individuals. The result of the 
preliminary Alco-Sensor test was .1 08 which is over the legal limit. Officer Palic then 
handcuffed Nicolescu and placed him in Palic's patrol vehicle to provide further breath 
samples. After a 15 minute wait period and an ALS advisory, using the Lifeloc 
instrument, further Nicolescu provided further samples which registered results of .1 03 
and .096. Nicolescu was then cited- not arrested- for Driving Under the Influence of 
Alcohol, a misdemeanor violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004. Nicolescu was not 
1 The State has provided the court with Officer Palic's audio of the investigation ofNicolescu. The audio 
was not introduced or admitted as an exhibit at the July 2 suppression hearing. However, subsequent to the 
hearing the court obtained and reviewed the audio recording. 
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transported to the Ada County Jail to be booked for the DUI, rather he was transported to 
St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center for treatment of the eye injury. 
On December 2, 2011, Nicolescu filed a motion to suppress the results of the 
second breath test, asserting that the officer did not have the necessary probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion to request Nicolescu submit to further evidentiary testing, absent the 
results of the preliminary breath test. Nicolescu also asserts that it was improper for the 
officer to require him to submit to the preliminary breath test in order to substantiate 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion to charge Nicolescu with DUI. On April 5, 2012, 
the state filed its opposition to defendant's Motion. The hearing was scheduled for 
February 14, 2012 but was continued at Defendant's request. The next scheduled hearing 
was continued due to an officer's unavailability. The Court took up the Motion at hearing 
on July 2, 2012. 
II. ANALYSIS 
An officer who has reasonable grounds to believe a person is driving under the 
influence (DUI) of alcohol may require a driver to submit to evidentiary testing to 
determine if their breath/alcohol content is greater than the statutory limitation of .08. See 
I.C. § 18-8002. Idaho Code § 18-8002(9) defines evidentiary testing as a procedure or 
test or series of procedures or tests utilized to determine the concentration of alcohol. If a 
person submits to testing at the request of a peace officer and has an alcohol 
concentration ofless than .08, they shall not be prosecuted for DUI. LC. § 18-8004(2). 
The detention of Nicolescu for investigation is a seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment which guarantees freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. 
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Harwood, 133 Idaho 50, 981 P.2d 1160 (Ct. App. 1999). Although in this case, the 
specific issue is not "the stop" because Nicolescu had been involved in a traffic accident 
and the officers did not witness any driving pattern or traffic infractions. A Fourth 
Amendment issue arises here because the preliminary breath test is also a search 
requiring either a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement. It is well settled 
that an investigatory detention is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 s. Ct 1868 (1968). Here Nicolescu challenges the request 
for a preliminary breath test on the grounds that Officer Palic allegedly used it as a basis 
to establish a reasonable suspicion or probable cause that Nicolescu had been driving 
under the influence. The reasonableness of an investigatory detention is a fact-intensive 
determination, from the perspective of an objectively reasonable officer, but "in view of 
all of the surrounding circumstances" of the particular incident. State v. Waldie, 126 
Idaho 864, 893 P.2d 811 (Idaho App. 1995). The reasonable suspicion standard requires 
less than probable cause but more than mere suspicion or instinct on the part of the 
officer. State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474,483, 988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct. App. 1999). In this 
case Nicolescu had been involved in a collision and there was a need for assistance. 
Officer Palic had a duty to investigate the accident and determine if Nicolescu had been 
injured. 
Officer Palic promptly made several observations which led him to believe that 
Nicolescu may have been driving under the influence of alcohol. Palic started to conduct 
standard field sobriety tests but discontinued them because he noted Nicolescu had 
suffered an eye injury and was visibly shaken by the accident. Palic testified that there 
might have been a safety issue and that the results of the FSTs could have been 
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compromised had he continued with them. Discontinuing the FSTs was reasonable 
because Nicolescu may have injured himself attempting to perform the tests and it would 
not have been fair to require Nicolescu to perform the tests. 
The State contends Palic adapted to the unique facts and circumstances by asking 
Nicolescu to submit to a preliminary breath test, which was the only thing he could do. 
The State contends that Nicolescu consented to take the preliminary breath test. 
In a consent situation, the burden is on the state to show that the consent was voluntary 
and not the product of coercion, either direct or implied; the consent is evaluated in light 
of all the attendant circumstances which existed at the time consent was given. State v. 
Zavala, 5 P.3d 993, 134 Idaho 532, 536 (Idaho App. 2000). Further, consent may be 
voluntary even if given during a lawful investigatory detention, State v. Johnson, 137 
Idaho 656 (Ct. App. 2002). 
Palic administered an AlcoSensor test to determine if Nicolescu should be 
detained for further investigation. As Officer Moore testified, the investigation would 
have ended ifNicolescu had registered a preliminary breath test result under .08. 
The AlcoSensor test clearly does not meet statutory requirements for admission of 
a breath test under I. C. 18-8004( 4). It is not certified or performance verified. In this 
case where standard FSTs could not be utilized Palic used the AlcoSensor for a 
preliminary breath test to determine if Nicolescu should be investigated further or 
released. 
After the AlcoSensor test was administered Nicolescu was required to submit to 
testing on the LifeLoc which resulted in the DUI charge. There is no express statutory 
MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER- 6 
000079
authority either prohibiting or permitting a preliminary breath test. There is no Idaho 
case law discussing the use of the preliminary breath test. 
In this case Palic testified that based on what he had observed he would have 
arrested Nicolescu for suspicion of DUI prior to administering the preliminary breath test. 
However, Palic's comments demonstrate there was uncertainty as to whether Nicolescu 
was under the influence. Palic indicated to Nicolescu that after the preliminary breath 
test he would make his determination from there. 
At the time the test was provided Nicolescu was not handcuffed or restrained. He 
was not seated in a patrol vehicle. Rather he was standing outside of Palic's squad car. 
The administration of a blood alcohol test constitutes a seizure of the person and a search 
within the purview of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1833-34, 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 
917-18 (1966); State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302, 160 P3d at 741 (2007); State v. LeClercq, 
243 P.3d 1093, 149 Idaho 905 (Idaho App. 2010). Taking one's breath for a preliminary 
breath test is a search under the Fourth Amendment. County of Milwaukee v. Proegler, 
291 N.W.2d 608, 612 (Ct. App. 1980); see also State v. LeClercq, 243 P.3d 1093, 149 
Idaho 905 (Idaho App. 2010) (a blood alcohol test constitutes a seizure of the person and 
a search within the purview of the Fourth Amendment). 
Searches and seizures performed without a warrant are presumptively 
unreasonable. Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302, 160 P.3d at 741. To overcome the presumption, 
the State bears the burden of establishing two prerequisites. !d. First, the State must prove 
that a warrantless search fell within a well-recognized exception to the w~ant 
requirement. Id Second, the State must show that even if the search is permissible under 
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an exception to the warrant requirement, it must still be reasonable in light of all of the 
other surrounding circumstances. !d. Valid consent is an exception to the warrant 
requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); State v. Fee, 135 
Jdaho 857, 862, 26 P.3d 40, 45 (Ct. App. 2001). The state has the legal burden of 
proving that Nicolescu's consent was given freely, understandingly and voluntarily, and 
not the result of duress or coercion, either direct or implied. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 
412 U.S. 218, 248, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2058-59, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 875 (1973); State v. Zavala, 
5 P.3d 993, 134 Idaho 532, 536 (Idaho App. 2000). 
In determining whether consent was voluntary, the trial court should consider 
whether the individual was threatened or coerced, and whether he was informed of his 
rights. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 
(1973). Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances, 
and while the subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, 
the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to_ 
establishing a voluntary consent. Bustamante, 412 U.S, at 248-49. 
In this case the evidence demonstrates that Nicolescu was not given the choice to 
submit to or decline preliminary breath testing. He was merely told that he was going to 
have to blow into a device. There was no explanation that he did not have to submit to 
the preliminary breath test and that if he declined it wouldn't be used against him. There 
was no indication that the preliminary breath test was "offered" to Nicolescu. Nicolescu 
was simply told that he would blow into a device. The State must show consent was 
given freely and voluntarily. In this case Nicolescu acquiesced when he was told he was 
going to blow into a device. Mere submission to lawful authority does not equate to 
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consent, rather valid consent must be unequivocal and specific, and freely and 
intelligently given. US. v. Manuel, 992 F.2d 272, 275 (lOth Cir.l993) (citing Florida v. 
Royer, 460 U.S. 491,497, 103 S.Ct. 1319,75 L.Ed.2d 229 [1983] ). Nicolescu was never 
offered a choice. Rather he was simply told he was going to blow into a device. 2 
The State has failed to show that Nicolescu's consent was given freely, 
understandingly and voluntarily. 3 Where the State fails to meet its burden, evidence 
acquired as a result of an illegal search, including later-discovered evidence derived from 
the original illegal search, is inadmissible in court. State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796, 
69 P.3d 1052, 1057 (2003); State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 219, 984 P.2d 703, 707 
(1999). See also Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984). The exclusionary 
nile states that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible 
in the criminal trial of a defendant. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 394-98, 34 
S.Ct. 341, 345-46, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914); State v. Johnson, 716 P.2d 1288, 110 Idaho 516 
(Idaho 1986). 
2 Preliminary breath tests are commonly used by officers in the field to evaluate a DUI suspect's 
breath/alcohol content in other jurisdictions. Because Idaho law does not specifically allow preliminary 
breath tests, the investigating officer must assure that the suspect freely, understandingly and voluntarily 
consents to the test. At a minimum the officer must: (I) Explain what the preliminary breath test is and 
why it is being offered; (2) explain to the suspect that he has a choice to take the test or decline the test; (3) 
actually ask the suspect if he is willing to take the test; (4) obtain consent of the suspect. 
3 Nicloescu probably would have consented to the preliminary test because he indicated he wanted to 
cooperate. However, his options were never explained to him. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the court finds that Nicolescu did not freely, 
understandingly and voluntarily consent to the preliminary breath test. In this case 
where it would have been unsafe and unfair to require Nicolescu to complete the standard 
filed sobriety tests, it was reasonable for Palic to use the preliminary breath test 
investigative tool to determine if Nicolescu was over the legal limit. However, 
Nicolescu did not consent freely, understandingly and voluntarily to the preliminary 
breath test. 
Without the preliminary breath test the officer did not have the necessary 
reasonable and articulable suspicion to request Nicolescu submit to further evidentiary 
testing. Thus the subsequent breath alcohol results obtained on the Lifeloc are 
inadmissible in this case. Nicolescu's Motion to Suppress is hereby granted. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED THIS&day of July, 2012. 
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P.O. Box 500 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Ed Guerricabeitia, Esq. 
DVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE 
Capitol Chase Plaza, Suite 600 
P.O. Box 1583 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
_ By United States mail 
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) Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076 
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KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU, ) 
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___________________________ ) 
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CARY B. COLAIANNI 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY 
Sarah A. Millar 
Assistant City Attorney 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
P.O. Box 500 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500 
Telephone: (208) 384-3870 
Idaho State Bar No. 7439 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ Appellant 
AUG 2 9 2012 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By ELAINE TONG 
DEPUTY 
RECEIVEt IN TRANSCRIPTS ~ '.JJ" '1. rlfv 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THESTATEOFIDAHO, ) 
') 
Plaintiff! Appellant, . ) Appeal Case No. CR-MD-2011-17076 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU, ) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) 
Defendant/Respondent. ) . 
_________________________ ) 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, KEVIN M. NICOLESCU , BY AND 
THROUGH ED GUERRICABEITIA, ATTORNEY OF RECORD, AND THE CLERK 
OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellant, the State of Idaho, appeals against the Defendant, Kevin 
M. Nicolescu, to the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, from the Memorandum 
Decision Regarding Motion to Suppress in Case No. CR-MD-2011-17076, entered on July 25, 
2012, in the Magistrate's Division of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Honorable 
· Judge John Hawley, Jr. presiding. 
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2. That the State has the right to appeal ~o the District Court, and the Judgment described 
1 
in paragraph 1 above is appealable under and pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 54.1. 
3, That the appeal is taken upon all matters of fact and law. 
4. That the Appellant anticipates raising issues including, but not limited to: 
a. Whether the Magistrate Court erred in gnmting Mr. Nicolescu's Motion to 
Suppress. 
6. The State requests no additional documents be included in the clerk's record beyond 
those automatically included under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate Rules: 
I 
7. That the proceedings before the Honorable Judge John Hawley, Jr. on the Motion to 
Suppress were electronically tape recorded in the Magistrate's Division and said tape recording is 
in the possession and under the control of the Magistrate's Division of the Fourth Judicial 
District, County of Ada, State of Idaho. 
8. That pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 54.6(a), a transcript should be required. 
9. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule 20. 
DATED this ~ day of August, 2012. 
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Sarah A. Millar 
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000088
, 
. ( 
t· 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I have on this ~ day of August, 2012, served the foreg()ing 
document on counsel for the Defendant/Respondent as follows: 
Ed Guerricabeitia 
DAVISON COPPLE COPPLE & COPPLE 
Attorneys at Law 
PO Box 1583 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
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INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
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BOISE CITY ATTORNEY 
Sarah A. Millar 
Assistant City Attorney 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
P.O. Box 500 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500 
Telephone: (208) 384-3870 
Idaho State Bar No. 7439 
No. ___ Fin:nn-:+b!!;-.:_ A.M·-----F-Ili~~ J.c: '12, 
AUG 2 9 2012 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By ELAINE TONG 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076 
v. 
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
MOTION TO HOLD MATTER IN 
ABEYANCE PENDING APPEAL 
Defendant. 
______________ ) 
COMES NOW the State of Idaho, by and through Sarah A. Millar, Assistant City 
Attorney, and respectfully moves the Court to hold the above-entitled matter in abeyance. 
Contemporaneous with this Motion the State has filed a Notice of Appeal of this Court's 
Memorandum Decision Regarding Motion to Suppress. The State moves to hold this matter in 
abeyance until a ruling has been obtained on the appeal pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 54.1(d) 
and Idaho Appellate Rule 11 ( c )(7). 
DATED this ~ day of August 2012. 
Sarah A. Millar 
Assistant City Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ?st day of August 2012, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Ed Guerricabeitia 
DAVISON COPPLE COPPLE & COPPLE 
Attorneys at Law 
PO Box 1583 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
2(usMAIL 
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
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NO. 1(' 
FILED t.(b A.M ____ ,P.M--:..---
AUG 3 1 2012 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By RAE ANN NIXON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
) Case No. CRMD-2011-0017076 
. .. 
vs. 
) 
KEVIN M. NICOLESCU, ) NOTICE OF PREPARATION 
) OF APPEAL TRANSCRIPT 
Defendant/ Appellant, ) 
A Notice of Appeal was filed in the above-entitled matter on August 31, 2012 and a copy of said 
Notice was received by the Transcription Department onAugust 31, 2012. I certify the estimated 
cost of preparation of the appeal transcript to be: 
Type ofHearing: Appeal 
Date of Hearing: July 2, 2012 Judge: John Hawley, Jr. 
45 Pages x $3.25 = $146.25 
Pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 83(k)(l), the appellant must, Urtless otherwise 
ordered by. a District Judge, pay the estimated fee for the preparation of the transcript within 
fourteen (14) days after the filing of the Notice of Appeal, and the appellant shall pay the balance of 
the fee, if any, for the transcript upon completion. 
In this case, the Ada Co. Prosecutor has agreed to pay for the cost of the transcript fee upon 
completion of the transcript. '.: 
The Transcription Department will prepare the transcript and file it with the Clerk of the District 
Court within thirty-five (35) days from the date of this notice. The transcriber may mak.e 
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• • a ~ 
application to the District Judge for an extension oftime in which to prepare the transcript. 
Dated this 31st day of August, 2012. 
ANN NIXON 
Ada County Transcript Coordinator 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certifY that on this 31st day of August, 2012, a true and correct copy of the Notice of Preparation 
of Appeal Transcript was forwarded to Appellant or Appellant's attorney of record, by first class 
mail, at: 
Ada Co. Prosecutor 
200 West Front Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
SARAH MILLAR 
ANN NIXON 
Ada County Transcript Coordinator 
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A.M ,/o .'.z/ zFILE~.M .. ___ _ 
SEP 1 2 2012 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By MARTHA LYKE 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH IDDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076 
ORDER GOVERNING 
PROCEDURE ON APPEAL 
Notice of Appeal having been filed herein, and it appearing that a transcript of all the 
testimony of the original trial or hearing is required by Appellant to resolve the issues on appeal: 
It is ORDERED: 
1) That Appellant shall order and pay for the estimated cost of the transcript within 14 
days after the filing of the notice of appeal. 
2) That Appellant's brief shall be filed and served within 35 days of the date of the notice 
of the filing of the transcript. 
3) That Respondent's brief shall be filed and served within 28 days after service of 
appellant's brief. 
4) That Appellant's reply brief, if any, shall be filed and served within 21 days after service 
of respondent's brief. 
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; 
5) That either party may notice the matter for oral argument in writing after all briefs are 
filed, and that if within fourteen (14) days after the final brief is filed, neither party does so notice 
for oral argument, the Court may deem oral argument waived and decide the case on the briefs and 
the record. 
Dated this 12th day of September 2012. 
afh4?--
MICHAEL MCLAUGHLIN 
Sr. District Judge 
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correct copy of the within instrument to: 
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Deputy Court ClerK 
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COMES NOW, the Appellant by and through Sarah A. Millar, Assistant City Attorney, 
and hereby files its Appellant's Brief in the above-captioned matter. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In the early morning hours of October 15, 2011, Officer Chris Palic responded to the 
intersection of Idaho and 16th streets in Boise, Ada County, Idaho in reference to a vehicle 
copision. (Tr., p. 6, Ls. 2-11.) Palic made contact with the driver of one of the vehicles involved 
in the accident, Kevin Nicolescu. (Tr., p. 6, Ls. 17-18; p. 7, Ls. 3-6.) Palic did this at the 
request of one of the investigating officers based on that officer's suspicion that the defendant 
may have been driving under the influence of alcohol. (Tr., p.7, Ls. 19-25.) 
Upon contact with Nicolescu, Palic noted several indicators of alcohol consumption 
including "a very strong odor of alcoholic beverage coming from [Nicolescu's] breath as he 
spoke", that he was unsteady on his feet, that he "had a pretty severe sway", and that he had 
bloodshot, watery eyes. Additionally, Nicolescu admitted to Palic that he had consumed alcohol 
that night. (Tr., p. 7, Ls. 15-21.) Palic did not note any slurred speech or impaired memory, 
however. (Tr., p. 18, Ls. 9-12.) 
Palic asked whether Nicolescu had been medically cleared, to which Nicolescu indicated 
that he had. (Tr., p. 8, Ls. 3-5.) At that time, Palic began conducting field sobriety tests. The 
first test he conducted was the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test. (Tr., p. 8, Ls. 23-24.) 
Nicolescu scored 4 of 6 possible points on the test (meeting the decision points), but was unable 
to finish due to an apparent injury he had sustained to his· left eye as a result of the accident. (Tr., 
p. 9, Ls. 1-6.) Palic directed Nicolescu to be checked by paramedics again, and thereafter 
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attempted to complete the HGN test. Palic observed that Nicolescu's eye was still bothering him 
and discontinued the test. (Tr., p. 9, Ls. 6-12.) 
Palic did not perform any other standardized field sobriety tests on Nicolescu at that time, 
as Nicolescu began to shake and complained of being unsteady on his feet due to a rush of 
adrenaline as a result of the accident. (Tr., p. 10, Ls. 3-13.) 
Although Palic had probable cause to arrest Nicolescu for DUI, Palic decided to collect a 
final piece of evidence using a handheld breath test instrument called an Alcosensor. (Tr., p. 10, 
Ls. 15-18, 24-25.) Immediately after having attempted the HGN test for the second time, and 
without handcuffing Nicolescu or placing him in his patrol vehicle, Palic had Nicolescu blow 
·into; his handheld Alcosensor. (Tr. at p. 11, Ls. 5-18.) According to Palic, the purpose of 
administering this test was not to obtain and thereafter introduce a specific alcohol level into 
evidence at a trial, but rather to test for the presence of alcohol as an additional· piece of his 
investigation into whether Nicolescu was driving under the influence of alcohol. (Tr., p. 22, Ls. 
7-10.) Officer Moore who assisted Palic and ultimately administered the final evidentiary test, 
explained that the Alcosensor did indicate a number, and had Nicolescu's result registered lower 
than the statutory threshold of .08, Nicolescu would not have been arrested1. (Tr., p. 40, Ls. 9-
11; p. 40, L. 20 through p. 41, L. 6.) 
At that time, and based on the totality of the circumstances he observed, Palic turned 
Nicolescu over to Officer Moore, who then administered the evidentiary breath test with a 
Lifeloc instrument in accordance with statutory requirements (ld. at p. 28, Ls. 19-21) and 
1 While Palic's testimony did not specifically address this, it can be presumed that Nicolescu was in excess of the 
.08 threshold based on Officer Moore's testimony, that Nicolescu would not have been arrested had he blown under 
.08 on the Alcosensor. {Tr p. 40, Ls. 9-11; p. 40, L. 20 through p. 41, L. 6.) 
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Nicolescu was ultimately charged with driving under the influence based on the results of that 
test. (Tr. p. 12, Ls. 2-14.) Nicolescu was not taken to the jail, however, but rather, was cited and 
released so he could seek further medical treatment at the hospital for injuries sustained in the 
accident. (Tr. p. 11, Ls. 18-23.) 
On December 5, 2011, Nicolescu filed Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. The 
State responded with its Brief in Opposition to the Suppression of Lifeloc Breath Test Results 
filed April 6, 2012. After several continuances, a hearing on Nicolescu's niotion 'Yas held July 
2, 2012, at 3:30p.m. After consideration of testimony and the filings by both parties, the court 
issued a written opinion on July 25, 2012, granting the Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
Evidence. The State thereafter concurrently filed a Notice of Appeal and Motion to Hold Matter 
in Abeyance on August 29, 2011. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Did the magistrate court err when it concluded that sufficient evidence did not exist to allow 
officers to administer a breath test ofNicolescu? 
ARGUMENT 
A. Introduction 
Nicolescu was cited for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol in violation of Idaho 
Code § 18-8004. He filed a motion to suppress the breath results, asserting that the preliminary 
breath test offered by Palic was not supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause and that 
it was therefore a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. (Def.'s Mot. to Suppress Evidence 
' p. 7.) The magistrate court granted the motion to suppress, holding that based on the Palic's 
failure to obtain specific consent from Nicolescu, the preliminary breath test administered by 
3 
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Palic was an illegal search, and that without such preliminary breath results, reasonable and 
articulable suspicion did not exist to allow further evidentiary testing of Nicolescu. J 
(Mem.Decision Regarding Mot. to Suppress pp. 9-10.) The magistrate court erred in its 
decision. The magistrate court incorrectly treated Nicolescu's roadside blow into an Alcosensor 
as an evidentiary search, requiring consent, This is in error for two reasons: First, cons~nt is not 
required prior to performing an evidentiary breath test. Second, and more importantly, the 
roadside preliminary breath test was not a formal evidentiary test equating to a de facto arrest, 
and should not have been treated as such. 
After improperly eliminating the Alcosensor breath test from its analysis, the magistrate 
court then found that officer administration of the evidentiary breath test was not supported by 
reasonable suspicion. This was error because whether or not the preliminary Alcosensor test was 
used, not only was the reasonable suspicion standard met, but the higher threshold of probable 
cause existed to arrest Nicolescu and administer the evidentiary breath test. 
B. Standard of Review. 
The standard of review for a suppression motion is bifurcated. An appellate court will 
accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts. State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 
232, 127 P.3d 133, 135 (2005). 
C. An Officer does not Have to Obtain Specific Consent to Administer a Breath or Blood 
Test from a Suspect Who has been Driving. 
The State does not dispute that a traditional evidentiary breath test constitutes a search 
and seizure of a person under the Fourth Amendment as well as Article I, section 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). See also Hafen v. 
4 
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State, 136 Idaho 829, 833, 41 P.3d 257, 261 (2002). In order to overcome the presumption that 
such a seizure is unlawful, the State must prove that it falls within a recognized exception to the 
warrant requirement. Consent is one of these exceptions. Hafen, 136 Idaho at 833, 41 P.3d at 
261. 
In the instant case the magistratt;: held: 
The state must show consent was given freely and voluntarily. In this case 
Nicolescu acquiesced when he was told he was going to blow into a 
device. Mere submission to lawful authority does not equate to consent, 
rather valid consent must be unequivocal and specific, and freely and 
intelligently given. Nicolescu was never offered a choice. 
(Mem. Decision Regarding Mot. to Suppress, dated July 25, 2011, pp. 8-9.) (citations omitted). 
It is on the basis of lack of consent that the magistrate court determined the preliminary breath 
test administered by Palic was unlawful. It appears that the magistrate court considered the 
preliminary breath test a traditional evidentiary breath test as a per se arrest for purposes of 
Fourth Amendment analysis. 
However, with regard to investigations of driving under the influence in violation of 
Idaho Code § 18-8004(1)(a), the Idaho Legislature has addressed this issue, and Idaho courts 
have as well. Idaho Code § 18-8002(1) reads, 
Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
in this state shall be deemed to have given his consent to evidentiary 
testing for concentration of alcohol as defined in section 18-8004, Idaho 
Code, and to have given his consent to evidentiary testing for the presence 
of drugs or other intoxicating substances, provided that such testing is 
administered at the request of a peace officer having reasonable grounds to 
believe that person has been driving or in actual physical control 'of a 
motor vehicle in violation of the provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho 
Code, or section 18-8006, Idaho Code. 
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(emphasis added). Idaho courts have addressed this statute directly, and reiterated the plain 
language of§ 18-8002(1). The Court of Appeals noted in State v. Cooper, 
Idaho's driver licensing scheme provides, as a condition of possessing a 
valid license, that a driver of a motor vehicle is deemed to have consented 
to an evidentiary test for blood alcohol concentration where there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the person has been driving or in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of the DUI laws. 
136 Idaho 697, 699, 39 P.3d 637, 639 (2001). In State v. Diaz the Idaho Supreme Court stated, 
In Idaho "any person who drives or is in actual physical control" of a 
motor vehicle impliedly consents to evidentiary testing for alcohol at the 
request of a peace officer with reasonable grounds for suspicion of DUI. 
Implied consent to evidentiary testing is not limited to a breathalyzer test, 
but may also include testing the suspect's blood or urine. The evidentiary 
test to be employed is of the officer's choosing. 
144 Idaho at 302, 160 P.3d at, 741 (citations omitted). Similar rulings can be found in Hafen v. 
State, 136 Idaho at 832, 41 P.3d at 260, and State v. LeClercq, 149 Idaho 905, 909, 243 P.3d 
1093, 1097 (2010), the latter decision even specifying that "[w]hether or not a police officer 
.gives the required warnings bears nothing on the issue of consent." !d. 
Thus, if the preliminary breath test administered by Palic is considered an evidentiary test 
for purposes of Idaho Code § 18-8002(1 ), then consent had previously been given by the 
defendant when he drove his vehicle that night, and the magistrate court erred in holding that 
Nicolescu had failed to give consent. 
D. The Preliminary Breath Test is not an Evidentiary Test for Purposes of Idaho Code § 
18-8002 (1) but. Rather a Roadside Field Sobriety Test Requiring Reasonable Suspicion. 
In the alternative to the foregoing analysis however, the State contends that the 
preliminary breath test was not, in fact, an evidentiary test for purposes of Idaho Code § 18-
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8002(1), but rather more appropriately considered another of the many field sobriety tests 
commonly conducted as part of an investigatory detention at the side of the road. It is well 
established by the courts in this state that reasonable suspicion is the standard applied to such 
tests. 
In State v. Ferriera, 133 Idaho 474, .480, 988 P.2d 700, 706 (Ct.App. 1999) the Idaho 
Court of Appeals ruled that roadside field sobriety tests did not require probable cause, but 
rather, the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion, when it determined that roadside field 
sobriety tests were investigative detentions rather than de facto arrests. Having made that 
finding the Court stated, "Therefore, we hold again today, based on established precedent and 
thorough analysis, that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires only 
that an officer possess reasonable suspicion that a driver is operating a vehicle contrary to I.C. 
section 18-8004 before field sobriety tests may be administered." (Id. at 480-481, 988 P.2d at 
706-707 (citing State v. Pick, 124 Idaho 601, 605, 861 P.2d 1266, 1270 (Ct.App. 1993), State v. 
Jordan, 122 Idaho 771, 775, 839 P.2d 38, 42 (Ct.App. 1992)). 
Pertinent to the instant case, the Ferriera court provided insight into why that lesser 
standard was appropriate as it related to roadside field sobriety tests: "the factors to be 
considered in distinguishing an investigative stop from a de facto arrest include the seriousness 
of the crime, the location of the encounter, the length of the detention, the reasonableness of the 
officer's display of force, and the conduct of the suspect as the encounter unfolds." Id. at 480, 
988 P.2d at 706. 
With respect to the seriousness of the crime, the court provided, "The Idaho Supreme 
Court has previously held that '[w]ithout question, the drunk driver is one of society's greatest 
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concems'"Id., citing State v. Henderson, .114 Idaho 293, 295, 756 P.2d 1057, 1059 (1988). 
Here, Nicolescu was suspected of DUI, just as was the case in Ferriera. The State's interest in 
the instant case of enforcing the DUI laws was, to use the Ferriera court's terminology, "of 
paramount concern" id., and such violations are very serious in nature. 
With respect to the location of the encounter, the length of the detention, and the 
reasonableness ofthe officer's display of force, the Ferriera court reasoned, "Field sobriety tests 
are, by their very definition, done in the "field" typically on the side of a public thoroughfare and 
are ordinarily performed contemporaneously with a traffi<:: stop." Id. The field sobriety tests 
were performed immediately after Ferriera was asked to exit his vehicle. Id. In the instant case, 
Nicolescu was asked to blow into the Alcosensor instrument as he was standing on the side of 
the road, without restraint, without a wait period, and immediately after Palic determined he 
could not continue with the standardized field sobriety testing he had been conducting to that 
point. (Tr., at p. 11, Ls. 5-18; p. 36, Ls. 2-8.) 
In its decision the magistrate court, despite concluding that Nicolescu did not consent to 
the breath test and that it was therefore unlawful, did acknowledge that "[in] this case where it 
would have been unsafe and unfair to require Nicolescu to complete the standard filed [sic] 
sobriety tests, it was reasonable for Palic to use the preliminary breath test investigative tool to 
determine if Nicolescu was over the legal limit." (Mem. Decision Regarding Mot. to Suppress, 
dated July 25, 2011, p. 10 (emphasis added).) 
Finally, the Ferriera court noted, in opting not to follow Oregon and Colorado precedent, 
that there was a dual purpose of roadside field sobriety testing: 
[T]o either confirm or dispel the police officer's suspicion that the driver 
is operating his or her motor vehicle contrary to the law. Thus, if the 
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individual performs the field sobriety tests in such a manner as to dispel 
the officer's suspicions, absent other unique circumstances, the driver will 
be left to go on his or her way. 
Ferriera, 133 Idaho at 481-482, 988 P.2d at 707-708 (emphasis in original). In the instant case, 
testimony revealed that had Nicolescu's preliminary blow returned lower than the statutory 
threshold of .08, he would not have been arrested. (Tr., p. 40, Ls. 9-11; p. 40, L. 20 through p. 
41, L. 6.) This comports with the Ferriera court's duality ofpurpose analysis as well. 
Therefore, based on the Ferreira analysis, the preliminary breath test given by Palic in 
the instant case is much more like a roadside field sobriety test in every way pertinent to the 
determination of whether it qualifies as an investigatory detention rather than a de facto arrest. 
As such, the officer need only have formed reasonable suspicion that Nicolescu was driving 
under the influence of alcohol prior to administering the preliminary breath test to Nicolescu. 
The Court of Appeals has provided guidance in previous case law regarding the standard 
ofreasonable suspicion. In State v. Thornley, 141 Idaho 898, 120 P.3d 286 (Ct.App. 2005) the 
investigating officer observed that Thomley emitted the strong odor of alcohol as he passed. The 
officer confirmed this observation with another officer, then watched as Thomley got into his car 
and began to drive away. The officer then motioned for Thomely to pull over. Thomley 
admitted to the officer that he had one beer. Based on the strong odor of alcohol and admission 
of alcohol consumption, the officer required Thomley to perform field sobriety tests. ld. at 899, 
120 P.3d 286, 287. The court in Thomley held that this set of facts (strong odor and admission 
of alcohol consumption) was enough for the officer to form reasonable suspicion. Id. at 900-901 
120 P. 3d at 288-289. Based on this precedent, if reasonable suspicion is the correct standard, 
then Palic met and exceeded the threshold of reasonable suspicion to have Nicolescu submit to 
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the preliminary roadside breath test. Therefore the preliminary breath test was lawful and should 
be taken into consideration as part of the basis for requiring Nicolescu to submit to the 
evidentiary breath test using the Lifeloc. 
E. The Information Available to Palic at the Time he Required the Preliminary Breath 
Test Met the Requisite Standard to Allow Him to Conduct the Eventual Evidentiary 
Breath Test .. 
When requiring an evidentiary test, the State's burden to prove an exception to the 
warrant requirement does not end at consent. It is also incumbent upon the state to show that 
"even ifthe seizure is permissible under an exception to the warrant requirement, it 'must still be 
reasonable in light of all of the other surrounding c;ircumstances." State V. Diaz, 144 Idaho at 
302, 160 P.3d 739 citing State v. Halen,136 Idaho at 833, 41 P.3d at 261 . 
Ultimately, after omitting the preliminary breath test from its analysis due to its 
determination that such a test was unlawful based on lack of consent, the magistrate ruled that 
reasonable and articulable suspicion did not exist in this case sufficient to require the defendant 
to perform the ultimate evidentiary breath test that was given him, thereby suppressing the 
results ofthat test. (Mem. Decision Regarding Mot. to Suppress dated July 25,2012, p.10.) 
Prior to requesting an individual to submit to a breath test, an officer must have 
"reasonable grounds" to believe that an individual has been driving under the influence. Idaho 
Code§ 18-8002(1). Whether "reasonable gr<?unds" means probable cause, reasonable suspicion, 
or something else entirely is not clear in the case law. In State v. Thompson, the court noted that 
the State v. Ferreira decision "suggests that the l~sser standard of reasonable suspicion might 
suffice." 138 Idaho 512, 515, 65 P.3d 534, 537 (Ct.App. 2003). However, the comi in Thompson 
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did not actually rule on that issue because it determined the higher standard of probable cause 
was met in Thompson's case, making the determination unnecessary. Id. 
Even under the more stringent probable cause analysis, Palic had ample probable cause to 
require Nicolescu to take a breath test, without the preliminary breath test results, but especially 
inclusive of them. State v. Cooper, 119 Idaho 654, 809 P .2d 515 is instructive in this vein. In 
State v. Cooper, witnesses reported that the driver of a vehicle (Cooper) rolled her vehicle 
coming around Deadman's Curve after travelling at a high rate of speed and losing control. Id. 
at 655, 809 P.2d at 515-516. The officer did not speak with Cooper at the scene, but later 
received reports from dispatch that one of the medical responders suggested a blood alcohol test 
would be appropriate based on the fact she appeared intoxicated. Id. Thereafter other officers 
spoke to Cooper at the hospital and noted the odor of alcohol on her person. Noting no other 
signs of intoxication at that time they transported Cooper to the sheriff's office and conducted a I. 
breath test. Id. The court in that case found probable cause existed. Id. at 659, 809 P.2d at 515, 
520? 
Here, Palic made contact with Nicolescu at the request of another officer at the scene, 
who indicated a DUI investigation needed to be conducted. (Tr., p. 6, Ls. 20-23.) Palic noted 
~he strong odor of alcohol coming from Nicolescu, as well as his bloodshot watery eyes. (Tr., p. 
7, Ls. 15-16, 19.) Palic noted Nicolescu was unsteady on his feet and swayed. (Tr., p. 7, Ls. 16-
18.) Nicolescu admitted to consuming alcohol. (Tr., p.7, Ls. 19-21.) Palic was able to conduct 
one partial standardized field sobriety test, the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, which Nicolescu 
2The Thompson court overruled the Cooper decision on the basis that Idaho statutes no longer required probable 
cause, but did not overrule the fmding that probable cause existed in that case, citing State v. Cooper among others 
and indicating that the case(s) were "not instructive because when those cases arose, the statute expressly required 
probable cause". State v. Thompson 138 .Idaho 512, 515, 65 P.3d 534, 537 (Ct.App. 2003) 
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failed. (Tr., p. 9, Ls. 19-25.) Palic opted not to conduct any further standardized field sobriety 
tests due to Nicolescu's condition after having been in an accident. (Tr., p. 10, Ls. 7-13.) 
Instead, he had Nicolescu submit to a preliminary breath test which indicated Nicolescu had 
alcohol in his system (at some level in excess of .08). (Tr., p. 10, Ls. 15-18; p. 40, Ls. 9-11; p. 
40, L. 20 throughp. 41, L. 6.) 
While many of those observations could be explained away, an officer must base his 
decision on the totality ofthe circumstances, State v. Evans, 134 Idaho 560, 563, 6 P.3d 416, 419 
(Ct.App. 2000) and in this case based on applicable case law, probable cause and therefore the 
lesser threshold of reasonable suspicion existed for the officer to require Nicolescu to take a 
breath test. For this reason, the magistrate court erred in holding that the evidentiary breath test 
administered in this case should be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Appellant requests the magistrate's Memorandum Decision 
Regarding Motion to Suppress be reversed and the case be remanded for further proceedings. 
The State requests an oral argument be set upon the convenience of the Court's calendar 
prior to issuing a decision in this case.· 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
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I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Nature OfThe Case 
This an appeal by the State based upon the Magistrat~'s Memorandum Decision 
Regarding Motion to Suppress entered on July 25, 2012 granting Mr. Nicolescu's Motion to 
Suppress excluding any and all evidence that was derived from the preliminary breath test and 
later obtained as a result thereof 
B. Procedural History 
Mr. Nicolescu was cited for the misdemeanor charge of Driving Under The Influence of 
Alcohol, Idaho Code§ 18-8004 on October 15, 2011. 
On October 27, 2011, the undersigned counsel filed a Notice of Appearance and other 
pleadings, including an extension of time to file pre-trial motions which the Magistrate Court 
granted. On December 5, 2011, Mr. Nicolescu filed his Motion to Suppress and the evidentiary 
hearing was held July 2, 2012. 
After taking the matter under advisement, The Honorable John Hawley issued his 
Memorandum Decision Regarding Motion to Suppress on July 25, 2012, granting Mr. 
Nicolsecu's Motion to Suppress. On August 29, 2012, the State filed its Notice of Appeal. 
C. Statement o(Facts 
On October 15, 2011, Officer Chris Palic responded to a vehicular accident at the 
intersection ofldaho and 16th streets in the city ofBoise. {TR., p. 6, Ll. 2-13). At the scene, 
Officer Palic made contact with Kevin Nicolsecu who was one ofthe drivers involved in the 
'I accident. {TR., p. 7, Ll. 3-12). 
During the contact, Officer Palic detected a strong odor of alcohol coming from Mr. 
Nicolescu as he spoke, a belief that Mr. Nicolescu was unsteady on his feet and swaying in a 
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stationary stance. Officer Palic noticed that Mr. Nicolescu had red, bloodshot, watery eyes and 
Mr. Nicolsecu admitted he had consumed some alcohol that evening. (TR., p. 7, Ll. 13-21). 
Officer Palic also noticed that Mr. Nicolescu was not slurring his speech and did not show any 
signs of memory impairment. (TR., p. 18, Ll. 1-12). 
At that point, Officer Palic asked Mr. Nicolescu to submit to the Horizontal Gaze 
Nystagmus (HGN) test. Mr. Nicolescu complied and Officer Palic began to administer the test, 
but then had to stop the test because Mr. Nicolescu's left eye was bothering him. Officer Palic 
tried to continue the test again, but was only able to get a "partial nystagmus test" "cause it 
was clearly bothering him." (TR., p. 9, Ll1-12) (Emphasis added). 
Officer Palic elected not to conduct any other Field Sobriety Tests (FSTs) because of the 
adrenaline setting in from the accident. Officer Palic felt that because of the adrenaline, going 
forward with other FSTs would have "clearly" affected his performance on them. (TR., p. 10, 
Ll. 2-13, p. 18, Ll. 13-15). On cross-examination, when asked why he elected not to administer 
any further FSTs, Officer Palic responded: 
Again, it was to benefit Mr. Nicolescu. I could tell he was obviously-- the 
adrenaline was starting to kick in from the collision; I could just tell that just 
based on how he was standing, you could see him physically shaking. So, to give 
him the benefit of the doubt, I was not going to make him go through those, 
'cause clearly he would have met decision points and it would have been 
much harder to determine, okay, is that the result of him and adrenaline. 
_J (Tr., p. 18, Ll. 16-25) (Emphasis added). 
At this point, Officer Palic decided to administer a preliminary breath test with the Alco-
Sensor which test result exceeded .08. (TR., p. 10, Ll. 14-16, p. 40, Ll. 9-25, p. 41, Ll. 1-10). 
Based on the results from the preliminary breath test, Officer Palic and Officer Moore continued 
their investigation and then proceeded to observe the 15 minute wait period, read him the ALS 
form, check the Lifeloc device and administer two additional breath samples. (TR., p. 11, Ll. 24-
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25, p. 12, Ll. 1-14, p. 34, Ll. 7-14, p. 41, Ll. 2-10). 
On cross-examination, Officer Palic noted that Mr. Nicolescu had cuts and abrasions to 
his face as a result ofhis air bag deploying from the accident and acknowledged that it was 
reasonable to conclude that dust and debris from the deployment of an air bag would give the 
appearance of someone having glassy and bloodshot eyes. (TR., p. 13, Ll. 20-25, p. 14, Ll. 1-
18). 
Both Officer Palic and Officer Moore, Palic's supervisor, acknowledged when 
administering an evidentiary test, it is mandatory procedure to wait 15 minutes before 
administering the test. (TR., p. 19, Ll. 10-25, p. 20, L. 1, p. 35, Ll. 12-25, p. 36, L. 1). When 
Officer Palic decided to administer the preliminary test, he admitted that he did conduct the 
mandatory 15 minute wait period. (TR., p. 20, Ll. 2-5). 
Officers Palic and Moore testified that they were unaware of any statutory authority or 
any rules or regulations that governed administering a preliminary test. (TR., p. 20, Ll. 9-25, p. 
33, Ll. 2-25, p. 34, Ll. 1-2). 
Officer Palic stated that he would have placed Mr. Nicolescu regardless of the 
preliminary breath test. (TR., p. 10, Ll. 19-25, p. 11, Ll. 1-4). However, Officer Moore's 
testimony clearly contradicted Officer Palic's opinion. When asked, Officer Moore, as his 
supervisor, responded as follows: 
By Mr. Guerricabeitia: 
Q. IfMr. Nicolsecu had blown a- -under a .08, would he have been 
arrested? 
A. No. 
By Ms. Miller: 
Q. When you say he would not have been arrested had he blown under a 
.08, are you talking about the evidentiary test that you did? 
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A. No. In-
Q. Areyou-
A. - regards to the presumptive. I - I call it a presumptive test rather than 
a preliminary test. 
Q. Okay. And so, you're saying that if he would have blown under the 
.08 for- oh, I guess-
A. Using the ALCO-SENSOR, had that been under the .08, no, I don't 
believe we would have proceeded any further with it. 
Q. Even given the other observations that you made? 
A. More than likely yes, that would have not happened. 
(TR., p. 40, Ll. 9-11 and 20-25, p. 41, Ll. 1-10). 
Officer Moore corroborates his conclusion, noting that he has on occasion relied on the 
results of a preliminary breath test to support his belief despite acknowledging the results 
produced by the ALCO-SENSOR are not accurate or certified by the State. (TR., p. 37, Ll. 11-
25, p. 38, L. 1). His response to the prosecutor's question on re-direct further corroborates that 
without the preliminary breath test, Mr. Nicolescu would not been arrested on the suspicion of 
driving under the influence: 
Q. And when you are giving a preliminary breath test, what is it that you're 
interested in obtaining from the test? 
A. Typically, it's for the purpose of showing that he is consuming alcohol and-
and sometimes, you know, where he's at as far as the amount of alcohol in his 
system. 
Q. Okay. Are you interested in the specific number in that-
A. Not-
Q. -event? 
A. -not necessarily, no. 
(TR., p. 39, Ll. 14-25) (Emphasis added). 
III. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether the Magistrate Court's decision in granting Mr. Nicolsecu's Motion to Suppress 
excluding any and all evidence, including incriminating statements, that were derived from the 
preliminary breath test and later discovered as a result of said breath test was proper and in 
accordance with law. 
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IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
On appeal from a trial court's order resolving a motion to suppress evidence, the 
appellate defers to the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence, 
but freely reviews the trial court's determination and application of constitutional principles to 
the facts found. State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 232, 127 P.3d 133, 135 (2005). 
"At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual 
conflicts, weigh evidence and draw factual inferences vested in the trial court." State v. 
Leclercq, 149 Idaho 905, 907, 243 P.3d 1093 (App.2010). 
B. The Magistrate's Decision to suppress the evidence that derived and flowed from 
the preliminary breath test was proper. 
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution forbids unreasonable searches and 
seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
The administration of a blood alcohol test constitutes a seizure of the person and 
a search within the purview of the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1833-34, 16 L.Ed.2d 
908, 917-18 (1966); State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). 
A search conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable unless the state can prove 
J that the search falls into one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. Schneckloth v. 
Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 97 (Ct. App. 2006). 
Consent is one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Zavala, 134 Idaho 532 
(App. 2000). 
In Zavala, the Idaho Court of Appeals explained the standard of review to be applied in 
evaluating a warrantless search pursuant to consent as follows: 
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The voluntariness of an individual's consent is evaluated in light of all the 
circumstances. (Citation omitted). The state has the heavy burden to prove that 
consent was given freely and voluntarily. (Citation omitted). The state must 
show that consent was not the result of duress or coercion, either direct or 
implied. (Citations omitted). If the district court determines that Zavala's consent 
was involuntary, then the evidence seized from the vehicle must be suppressed. 
Zavala, 134 Idaho at 536. 
Applying the foregoing standard, the Magistrate Court held: 
In this case the evidence demonstrates that Nicolescu was not given the choice to 
submit to or decline preliminary breath testing. He was merely told that he was 
going to have to blow into a device. There was no explanation that he did not 
have to submit to the preliminary test and that if he declined it wouldn't be used 
against him. There is no indication that the preliminary breath test was "offered" 
to Nicolescu. Nicolescu was simply told that he would blow into a device. The 
State must show consent was given freely and voluntarily. In this case Nicolescu 
acquiesced when he was told he was going to blow into a device. Mere 
submission to lawful authority does not equate to consent, rather valid consent 
must be unequivocal and specific, and freely and intelligently given. U.S. v. 
Manuel, 992 F.2d 272, 275 (lOth Vir.1993) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 
497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 [1983]). Nicolescu was never offered a 
choice. Rather he was simply told he was going to blow into a device. 
See, Memorandum Decision Regarding Motion to Suppress filed July 25, 2012 at 8-9. 
The State commences its first argument on the presumption that if a preliminary breath 
test is an evidentiary test for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, Idaho Code § 18-8002(1) 
does not require consent under the analysis by the Magistrate because it is implied in the 
language of the statute. 
Idaho Code § 18-1 002(1) reads: 
Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in this 
state shall be deemed to have given his consent to evidentiary testing for 
concentration of alcohol as defined in section 18-8004, Idaho Code, and to have 
given consent to evidentiary testing for the presence of drugs or other intoxicating 
substances, provided that such testing is administered at the request of a 
peace officer having reasonable grounds to believe that the person has been 
driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of the 
provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, or section 18-8006, Idaho Code. 
(Emphasis added). 
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The State cites several Idaho cases for the proposition that the language ofldaho Code§ 
18-8002(1) satisfies the consent exception for a warrantless search, thus the Magistrate's 
analysis and decision to suppress the evidence derived from the preliminary breath test was an 
error oflaw. Although it appears that the cases cited by the State support its proposition 
concerning whether consent was given in this case, it fails to address the prerequisite for which 
consent referenced in the statute is triggered to the facts of this case. 
In other words, the statute provides that a driver gives his consent to any evidentiary 
testing, so long as the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person was 
operating a vehicle in violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004. Here, Mr. Nicolescu was charged 
with a violation ofldaho Code § 18-8004. 
The issue before the Magistrate and the basis of the motion for suppression was whether 
an officer can require an individual to submit to a preliminary evidentiary test to substantiate 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion for an arrest is an issue of first impression. It is unclear 
what the standard is for an officer's administration of evidentiary testing because the Courts in 
this state have yet to decide this issue. 
Although Idaho Courts have yet to determine the proper standard, whether it is 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause, for an officer to request a breath test, it appears that the 
standard for evidentiary. testing is something more than reasonable suspicion. 
In Thompson v. State, 138 Idaho 512, 515, 65 P.3d 534, 537 (Ct. App. 2003), the Idaho 
Court of Appeals stated that it is not clear that probable cause is the correct standard for an 
officer to arrest a suspect and request a breath test, even though the defendant and the state 
agreed that it was the applicable prerequisite. Because the higher standard of probable cause was 
satisfied in this instance, the Court of Appeals declined to resolve the issue. Probable cause 
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existed here where the officer observed the defendant speeding, detected a strong odor of alcohol 
on his breath, observed bloodshot eyes and dilated pupils, was aware that the defendant refused 
to take field sobriety tests, and had reason to believe the defendant lied when he stated that he 
had not been drinking. Collectively, these circumstances supported the officer's reasonable 
belief that the defendant was driving while under the influence. Id. 
The Court of Appeals further stated in Thompson that its decision in State v. Ferreira, 
133 Idaho 474, 988 P.2d 700 (Ct. App. 1999), where it held that officers may administer field 
sobriety tests based on reasonable suspicion, suggests that the lesser standard of reasonable 
suspicion may suffice for an officer's administering of evidentiary tests. Id. However, field 
sobriety tests and evidentiary tests are not synonymous. An evidentiary test is the testing of 
blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the presence and/or concentration of 
intoxicating substances in a person. 1:c. § 18-8002A(e). Since the lesser standard applies to 
field sobriety tests, it appears that something more than reasonable suspicion is required for an 
officer to administer evidentiary testing. 
Probable cause is based on the totality of the circumstances. The Supreme Court ofldaho 
has stated: 
When reviewing an officer's actions the court must judge the facts against an objective 
standard. That is, ''would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or 
search warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was 
appropriate." Because the facts making up a probable cause determination are viewed 
from an objective standpoint, the officer's subjective beliefs concerning that 
determination are not material. 
State v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 136-37, 922 P.2d 1059, 1062-63 (1996). 
Reasonable suspicion requires less than probable cause, but more than mere speculation 
or instinct on the part of the officer. State v. McCarthy, 133 Idaho 119, 124, 982, P.2d 954, 959 
(Ct. App. 1999). Reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances and "must 
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yield a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the individual being stopped is or 
has been engaged in wrongdoing." State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 963, 88 P.3d 780, 782 
(Ct. App. 2004). 
Generally, cases in Idaho that involve probable cause for arrest or reasonable suspicion to 
perform field sobriety tests require more evidence that just the odor of alcohol and admission of 
drinking as evidence of alcohol or drug use in violation ofldaho Code § 18-8004. See State v. 
Finnicum, 147 Idaho 137, 140, 206 P.3d 501, 504 (Ct. App. 2009) (concluding that probable 
cause existed to arrest the defendant who smelled strongly of alcohol, slurred her speech, has 
glassy and bloodshot eyes, seemed confused, and failed the field sobriety tests); State v. Buell, 
145 Idaho 54, 175 P.3d 216 (Ct. App. 2008) (probable cause existed for arrest where defendant 
lost footing when exiting vehicle, admitted to consuming alcohol, and failed field sobriety tests); 
State v. Zubizareta, 122 Idaho 823, 828, 839 P.2d 1237, 1242 (Ct. App. 1992) (concluding that 
probable cause existed to arrest the defendant where the defendant had difficulty speaking and 
standing, he smelled of alcohol, he had watery eyes, urine-soaked trousers, an agitated attitude, 
and failed field sobriety tests). 
Moreover, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that a positive HGN test in conjunction 
with other field sobriety tests may supply probable cause for arrest, but standing alone does not 
provide proof positive of driving under the influence of alcohol. State v. Garrett, 119 Idaho 
878, 811 P.2d 488 (1991); cf. State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 988 P.2d 700 (Ct. App. 1999) 
(defendant failed HGN test, one-leg stand test, and heel-toe walking test). 
In the instant case, Officer Palic admits he was only able to get a partial nystagmus test 
and during the test he could tell Mr. Nicolescu's left eye was clearly bothering him. (TR., p. 9, 
Ll. 1-4 and 10-12). In this case, the HGN test performed was not complete and conducted to an 
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individual with an eye injury. 
Officer Palic acknowledged that dust and debris from the deployment of the airbag was a 
reasonable conclusion for why Mr. Nicolescu's eyes were red, bloodshot and glassy. See id., 
supra. Officer Palic noted that he observed no slurred speech or memory impairment from Mr. 
Nicolescu. Officer Palic, also, noticed that Mr. Nicolescu was shaking due to the adrenaline 
kicking in from the accident. (TR., p. 18, Ll. 17-21). 
Here, based on the totality of the circumstances, Officer Palic did not have the requisite 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause for Mr. Nicolescu's arrest absent the results of the 
preliminary breath test. Even if the officer only needed to satisfy the lesser standard, reasonable 
suspicion, in order to arrest Mr. Nicolescu and administer further evidentiary testing, the statute 
does not authorize administering a preliminary evidentiary test in order to substantiate probable 
cause to arrest and administer more evidentiary tests. Reasonable suspicion or probable cause 
must exist before an officer may administer evidentiary tests. 
Officer Palic detected the odor of alcohol on Mr. Nicolescu's breath, and Mr. Nicolescu 
admitted to drinking alcohol that night. Mr. Nicolescu was not slurring his speech, and did not 
show signs of impaired memory. The officer performed a partial HGN test on Mr. Nicolescu but 
was unable to finish because Mr. Nicolescu's eyes were bothering him. Mr. Nicolescu had just 
been in a collision accident, for which he was not at fault for, and debris had gotten into his eyes 
which was the reason that Mr. Nicolescu's eyes appeared red, glassy and bloodshot to the officer. 
The officer, not Mr. Nicolescu, elected not to continue performing the other field sobriety tests. 
At this point, the officer did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to arrest Mr. 
Nicolescu and administer any evidentiary tests. It was only then Officer Palic decided to 
administer the preliminary breath test, an evidentiary test, to determine whether further 
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evidentiary tests should be conducted, only the latter tests would be conducted with a device that 
satisfies the requirements by statute and ISP's rules and regulations to be admissible at trial. 
The only reason which Officer Palic provided when asked why administer a preliminary 
breath test if it is only used to detect the presence of alcohol when Mr. Nicolescu already 
admitted to drinking that evening and Officer Palic could smell it was nothing prohibited him 
from doing so. (TR., p. 20, Ll. 9-13). 
Q. Okay. You testified earlier that -that you believed you had enough 
information to- to arrest Mr. Nicolescu regardless of the preliminary breath test; 
is that correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. I guess I'm going to ask why, then, have him submit to a preliminary breath 
test? 
A. I guess my question to you would be why not? Again, it's another tool that's 
allowed to me, that I can use. 
(TR., p. 26, Ll. 24-25, p.27, Ll. 1-8). 
The same was true for Officer Moore: 
Q. So, why administer a preliminary breath test, that there was no need to, to test 
- for determination of or detecting alcohol in his system. 
A. Well, some officers do it, some don't. I- I don't personally like doing it, but 
some officers do and there's no- nothing that says we can't. .. 
(TR., p. 35, Ll. 5-10). 
Based on their testimony, it was obvious and the Magistrate could reasonably infer from 
the testimony that Officer Palic administered the preliminary breath test for the sole purpose of 
determining whether any reasonable suspicion or probable cause existed to arrest Mr. Nicolescu 
for driving under the influence. 
"In this case Palic testified that based on what he had observed he would have 
arrested Nicolescu for suspicion ofDUI prior to administering the preliminary 
test. However, Palic's comments demonstrate there was uncertainty as to whether 
Nicolescu was under the influence. Palic indicated to Nicolescu that after the 
preliminary breath test he would make his determination from there." See, 
Memorandum Decision Regarding Notion to Suppress filed July 25, 2012 at 7. 
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(Emphasis added). 
The Magistrate is vested with the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve 
factual conflicts, weigh evidence and draw factual inferences. See, State v. Leclercq, supra. 
The Magistrate, also, held that the AlcoSensor test "clearly does not meet statutory 
requirements for admission of a breath test under I. C. 18-8004( 4). It is not certified or 
performance verified. In this case where standard FSTs could not be utilized Palic used the 
AlcoSensor for a preliminary breath test to determine ifNicolescu should be investigated further 
or released." See, Memorandum at 6. 
Officer Palic admitted that he did not observe the 15 minute period prior to administering 
the preliminary breath test. (TR., p. 20, Ll. 2-5). Several Idaho appellate cases have held that 
an adequate foundation must be established to admit BAC results. See, State v. Utz, 125 Idaho 
127, 867 P.2d 1001 (App.1993) (failure to closely observe the individual during the 15 minute 
period); State v. Defranco, 143 Idaho 335, 144 P.3d 40 (App.2006) (officer failed to monitor 
defendant for continuous 15 minute period immediately preceding test); State v. Remsburg, 126 
Idaho 338, 882 P.2d 993 (Ct.App.1994) and State v. Carson, 133 Idaho 451, 988 P.2d 225 
(Ct.App.1999). 
Although the foregoing cases are not directly on point with the issue of whether an 
evidentiary test can be used as the basis to supply an officer with probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion, the cases are instructive to support the proposition. 
The Magistrate held: 
Without the preliminary breath test the officer did not have the necessary 
reasonable and articulable suspicion to request Nicolescu submit to further 
evidentiary testing. See, Memorandum at p. 10. 
The Magistrate's holding is supported by substantial and competent evidence in the 
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record, specifically, the testimony of Officer Moore who was at the scene to evaluate Officer 
Palic's investigation, where he testified that they (law enforcement officers) sometimes use the 
results of Alco-Sensor to determine whether to continue an investigation and in this case, had the 
preliminary breath test results been under .08, no further investigation would have been 
conducted. 
Even if this Court finds that the Magistrate's reasoning on "consent" to render its 
decision was incorrect, this Court can still sustain the ruling upon a proper theory. State v. 
Newman, 149 Idaho 596, 602, 237 P.3d 1222 (App.2010) ("Where a ruling in a criminal case is 
correct, though based upon an incorrect reason, it still may be sustained upon the proper legal 
theory."). Here, the officers did not have sufficient probable cause or reasonable suspicion to 
administer an evidentiary test. 
C. The Preliminary Breath Test is an Evidentiary Test under the Statute. 
In the alternative, the State takes the position that a preliminary breath test is not an 
evidentiary breath test for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis or Idaho Code § 18-8002(1 ). 
The State attempts to equate the preliminary breath test as another form of field sobriety testing. 
At the hearing, Officer Moore testified that a distinction exists between a preliminary 
breath test and an evidentiary test. Officer Moore's opinion of the distinction was that for a 
breath test to be an evidentiary test the results must comply with the State's rules and 
regulations, the machine has been checked, calibrated and verified, the individual is given his 
ALS Advisory rights etc. . . In essence, the evidence produced can be used and offered as proof 
in a trial. (TR., p. 34, Ll. 3-24, p. 35, Ll. 1-25, p. 36, Ll. 1-25, p. 37, Ll. 125, p. 38, L. 1). 
However, a preliminary or as he referred to as a ''presumptive test," is typically used to 
detect the presence of alcohol only and the results therefrom do not comply with State rules and 
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regulations nor used as evidence or proof in a trial. See id. However, Officer Moore did 
acknowledge that he has on occasion used the results of a ''presumptive" breath test to "check 
and see where they're at, as far as (unintelligible) a performance verification on them, and 
they're typically very close to what they should be." (TR., p. 37, Ll. 19-21). Again, had Mr. 
Nicolescu blown under .08 on the preliminary breath test, no further investigation would have 
taken place. (TR., p. 41, Ll. 2-10). 
Idaho Code § 18-8002 titled "Tests of driver for alcohol concentration, presence of drugs 
or other intoxicating substances- Suspension upon refusal of tests" defines an evidentiary test as 
follows: 
(9) For purposes of this section and section 18-8002A, Idaho Code, "evidentiary 
testing" shall mean a procedure or test or series of procedures or tests, including 
the additional test authorized in subsection (10) ofthis section, utilized to 
determine the concentration of alcohol or the presence of drugs or other 
intoxicating substances in a person. 
Subsection 10 of§ 18-8002 states: 
A person who submits to a breath test for alcohol concentration, as defined in 
subsection (4) of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, may also be requested to submit to 
a second evidentiary test ofblood or urine for the purpose of determining the 
presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances if the peace officer has 
reasonable cause to believe that a person was driving under the influence of any 
drug or intoxicating substance or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug 
or intoxicating substance. 
·See also, Idaho Code § 18-8002A. 
Nowhere under the Idaho Code expresses that a preliminary or "presumptive" breath test 
is different and distinct from an evidentiary breath test because the latter may be offered as 
evidence at trial. From the statutory language, it is clear that an evidentiary test is any breath, 
urine or blood test used to determine the presence and/or concentration of alcohol in a person. 
The State's distinction between a preliminary versus an evidentiary breath test is unfounded. 
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The State argues that the standard set forth in Ferriera, supra., where an officer need 
only reasonable articulable suspicion to administer field sobriety tests should apply in this case 
with regards to the use of the preliminary breath test. As expressed above, there is no distinction 
by statute between a preliminary breath test and an evidentiary test. 
As discussed above, the Thompson Court was presented with the very issue before this 
Court and elected not to making a ruling on the issue because either standard was met based on 
the facts of the case. "The present case, however, is not one that requires resolution of this 
narrow issue, for even assuming that probable cause sufficient to support an arrest is the correct 
standard to be applied, we hold that the standard is satisfied here." Thompson, 138 Idaho at 515. 
The State argues in support of one of the factors set forth in Pereira, supra., that the 
preliminary breath test is equivalent to an FST because the preliminary test was conducted on the 
side ofthe road. The State ignores the fact that the breath tests conducted with the Lifeloc were 
done in the back of the patrol car at the scene or in the "field" as well. 
The distinction between FSTs and evidentiary tests, whether preliminary or not, is that 
FSTs are not conclusive nor measure the concentration level of alcohol in an individual's system 
to determine whether a violation ofldaho Code§ 18-8004 has occurred. In order to determine 
the concentration level or BAC level, an evidentiary test of breath, blood or urine must be 
administered which calculates and measures the concentration level in the system. 
Here, Officer Moore admitted that the results from "presumptive" test are used, even 
though they are not State certified but ''they're close." (TR., p. 37, Ll. 11-25, p. 38, L. 1 ). 
Without the preliminary breath test, Officer Palic did not have probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion to have Mr. Nicolescu submit to another evidentiary test. The purpose for the 
preliminary breath test was simply because Officer Palic had a "hunch." 
RESPONDENT'S BRJEF- 18 
000135
Based on the statutory language and arguments above, the State's contention that a 
preliminary test is akin to an FST is without merit. 
V. CONCLUSION 
To allow officers to administer a preliminary evidentiary test in order to substantiate 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause would render an individual's constitutional right under 
the Fourth Amendment from unreasonable searches and seizures in a DUI context illusory. 
Furthermore, if the standard to administer an evidentiary test is the lesser standard of reasonable 
and articulable suspicion, then probable cause does not exist in a DUI context. 
Officers, on mere hunches, suspecting an individual is operating a vehicle under the 
influence could simply demand the individual to submit to a preliminary breath test to form the 
officer's reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Field Sobriety Tests would be irrelevant, and 
if administered would result in biased observations of officers to support an arrest. 
The practice of administering a preliminary evidentiary test creates a slippery slope 
between an individual's constitutional rights and the state's legitimate interest for the safety of 
others, which practice can be fraught with abuse by officers. 
If such practice is desired in the State ofldaho, the statute should be amended to allow 
for the practice which requires legislative action, not judicially reformation. 
Based on the foregoing case law, statutory authority and arguments above, Mr. Nicolescu 
respectfully requests that this Court affirm the Magistrate's Memorandum Decision Regarding 
Motion to Suppress. 
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DATED this 21st day ofDecember, 2012. 
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COMES NOW, the Appellant by and through Sarah A. Millar, Assistant City Attorney, 
and hereby files its Reply Brief in the above-captioned matter. 
REBUTTAL ARGUMENT 
A. Introduction. 
On appeal the State asserts that a preliminary breath test should be treated similarly to 
other field sobriety tests and that an officer must only have reasonable suspicion of DUI prior to 
administering a preliminary breath test. In the alternative, the State asserts that if the preliminary 
breath test is held to a higher standard ofprobable cause, in this case, probable cause existed to 
ask Defendant/Respondent, Kevin Michael Nicolescu (hereafter "Nicolescu) to submit to the 
breath test. Nicolescu misconstrues the State's argument, asserts that the preliminary breath test 
was an evidentiary test subject to Idaho Code § 18-8002, that the preliminary breath test results 
are not admissible at trial, and that Officer Palic was acting on a mere hunch when he required 
Nicolescu to submit to the preliminary breath test and therefore did not have reasonable 
suspicion. 
B. Preliminary Breath Tests is an Investigatory Detention Much Like Field Sobriety 
Tests, Rather than a de (acto Arrest. 
Officer Moore testified in response to Nicolescu's questions regarding the procedural 
differences from an officer's standpoint in using what he termed a "presumptive test" (referred to 
herein as "preliminary breath test") and an "evidentiary test" pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-8002. 
(Tr., p. 34, L. 3 through p. 38, L.l). Nicolescu asserts this testimonial distinction is the State's 
argument. (Resp't Br., pp. 16-17) 
Procedurally, officers treat evidentiary tests the State can admit into evidence at trial 
much differently than tests they are using for their own investigations. For what Officer Moore 
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distinguished as an evidentiary test, officers use a state-certified instrument and follow all state-
certified-standard operating procedures. (Tr., p. 36, L. 25 through p. 37, L. 10). For preliminary 
breath tests not intended for introduction at trial, but rather intended for an officer to use as part 
of his or her investigation, officers use a different instrument that has not gone through state 
certification, and the officers do not follow the state certified standard operating procedures 
when administering it. (Tr., p. 38, L. 11 through p. 39, L. 9). · 
The State does not argue that the mere fact the preliminary breath test is not administered 
in accordance with the statutory requirements for automatic admissibility at jury trial makes it on 
par with a field sobriety test (FST). Rather, the ~tate has based its argument on the 
characteristics making an FS T an. investigatory detention rather than de facto arrests set forth in 
Idaho case law. State v. Ferriera, 133 Idaho 474, 480, 988 P.2d 700, 706 (Ct.App. 1999) 
(Appellant's Br., pp. 6-9.) However, the distinctions made by Officer Moore do support that 
argument. It is clear from the case law and based on common sense, that there is a significant 
difference between handcuffing someone and placing them in the back of a patrol vehicle to wait 
for 15 minutes before administration of an evidentiary breath test, and standing next to their 
vehicle on the side of the road with freedom of movement contemporaneous with a traffic stop. 
!d. 
And while FSTs do not require handcuffing, transport in a police car, or a 15-minute 
waiting period, making them investigatory detentions as explained in Appellant's Brief, they do 
require performance of a series of divided attention tests that take time and effort on the part of 
the detainee. In comparison, a preliminary exhale into an instrument contemporaneous with a 
traffic stop is only slightly less convenient than breathing. In the instant case, the officer made 
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contact with the driver of a Vehicle involved in an accident, as part of the accident investigation. 
(Tr., p. 6, L.lO through p.7, L.12) The preliminary breath test was not only contemporaneous 
with the FSTs, but based on the unique circumstances, was given in place of them, requiring no 
greater length in detainment (Tr., p. 1 0, .L. 2 through p. 11, L. 19) and likely resulting in a shorter 
period of detainment. 
For the foregoing reasons, the preliminary breath test administered in the instant case was 
in.fact ari investigatory detention. 
C. Because the Preliminary Breath Test is an Investigatory Detention, it Does Not 
Require the Permissive Language of Idaho Code§ 18-8002 
Idaho Code § 18-8002(1) allows for evidentiary testing in DUI investigations based on · 
' 
the determination that drivers in Idaho are deemed to have consented to such testing. This 
statute is the means by which law enforcement officers are excepted from the warrant 
requirement, where they administer a breath, urine, or blood test for the concentration of alcohol 
or for the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances. Idaho Code § 18-8002(1 ); State v. 
Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741; State v. Cooper 136 Idaho 697, 699, 39 P.3d 637, 
639 (Ct. App. 2001). 
Defense argues that Idaho Code § 18-8002(9) makes it "clear that an evidentiary test is 
any breath, urine, or blood test used to determine the presence and/or concentration of alcohol in 
a person," and that this necessarily means Idaho Code § 18-8002 is the controlling statute. 
(Resp't Br., p. 17 (emphasis in original)) However, if you read Idaho Code§ 18-8002(9) in its 
entirety, it is clear that is not the case. It reads, 
For the pwposes of this section and section 18-8002A, Idaho Code, "evidentiary 
testing" shall mean a procedure or test or series of procedures or tests, including 
the additional test authorized in subsection (1 0) of this section, utilized to 
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determine the concentration of alcohol or the presence of drugs or other 
intoxicating substances in a person. 
(emphasis added). Idaho Code § 18-8002A( e) reads in part, 
Notwithstanding any other provision oflaw or rule of court, the results of any test 
for alcohol · concentration and records relating to calibration, approval, 
certification or quality control performed by a laboratory operated and approved 
by the Idaho state police or by any other method approved by the Idaho state 
police shall be admissible in any proceeding in this state without the necessity of 
producing a· witness to establish the reliability of the testing procedure for 
examination. 
The plain language of Idaho Code § 18-8002(9) indicates that the definition of 
evidentiary testing is only applicable for purposes of Idaho Code § § 18-8002 and 18-8002A. 
Just because a section of Idaho Code seeks to define the word "evidentiary testing" for its own 
purposes, does not mean that any time any breath test is conducted in the state of Idaho, § 18-
8002 is controlling. And it is clear from the plain language of Idaho Code § 18-8002A(e), its 
purpose is not to limit law enforcement in the collection of evidence in DUI investigations, but 
rather to streamline the process of admission of breath test results at trial provided the conditions 
of Idaho Code § 18-8002A( e) are met. 
The intention of Idaho Code § § 18-8002 and 18-8002A is to allow for a de facto arrest 
for evidentiary testing without a warrant and to provide for ease of admissibility of the test where 
certain conditions are met. But where a de facto arrest has not occurred, Idaho Code § 18-8002 
need not apply. 
D. Admissibility at Trial is Irrelevant to Whether Evidence can be Collected. 
Nicolescu cites several cases establishing that adequate foundation must be laid in order 
to admit BAC results at trial. (Resp't Br., p. 15) It appears this argument was made in support 
of the suppression of the preliminary breath test in the instant case based on the State's presumed 
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inability to lay proper foundation for it. The State is unaware of, and Nicolescu has not 
provided, any authority supporting the claim that the admissibility of a piece of evidence at trial 
has any bearing on whether officers can collect such evidence during the investigation of a 
potential crime. There are many examples of information officers use in investigation of a crime 
that are not intended for admission at trial. Examples include unsworn statements, NIK narcotic 
field testing, and polygraph results. Therefore, the State fails to see the relevance of these cases, 
but concedes that if the State were to attempt to admit any evidentiary tests at trial, it would 
expect to be required to lay proper foundation for those results. 
E. The Requisite Standard for Administration of the Breath Test was Met. 
'· 
Nicol:escu contends that in its Appellant's Brief the State failed to "address the prerequisite 
for which consent referenced in the statute is triggered to the facts of this case," being that the 
"officer has reasonable· grounds to believe that the person was operating a vehicle in 
violation of Idaho Code§ 18-8004". (Resp't Br., p. 10 (emphasis in original)) While the State 
maintains that the preliminary breath test is not subject to Idaho Code § 18-8002 as it was part of 
an investigatory detention, the State did in fact address the "reasonable grounds" requirement in 
section "E." of its Appellant's Brief, and reasserts the arguments and case law authority cited 
therein. (Appellant's Br., pp. 10-12.) If it was previously unclear in its Appellant's Brief, it is 
the State's ultimate argument that whether this Court finds that the preliminary breath test in the 
instant case amounts to an investigatory detention, requiring the lesser standard of reasonable 
suspicion, (see, e.g., State v. Ferriera, 133 Idaho 474, 480-481, 988 P.2d 700, 706-707 (Ct.App .. 
1999)), or that it was an evidentiary test pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-8002 and requires either 
reasonable suspicion, probable cause or something in between (see, e.g., State v. Thompson, 138 
.. 
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Idaho 512, 515, 65 P.3d 534, 537 (Ct.App. 2003)), the facts in this case support the finding that 
both have been met. Therefore, not only should the preliminary breath test be considered as part 
of the officers' reasonable basis for administering the ultimate evidentiary test, but even 
excluding the preliminary breath test, the officers met the requisite standard to administer the 
ultimate breath test, and the results therefrom should not be suppressed. 
Nicolescu has cited several cases wherein probable cause was found to have existed in DUI 
investigations as support for his contention that more than just odor of alcohol and admission to 
drinking alcohol is required for either the probable cause or the reasonable suspicion standard. 
(Resp't Br., p.12) However, such a conclusion does not logically follow, and Nicolescu has 
misconstrued the facts of this case with regard to the officer's observations prior to the 
administration of the breath test. 
In the instant case, Officer Palic had administered a partial horizontal gaze nystagmus test 
(HGN) wherein Nicolescu failed even prior to completion of that test (Tr., p. 9, Ls. 1-6), he 
observed a very strong odor of alcohol coming from Nicolescu's breath, and noticed that 
Nicolescu had a severe sway, and bloodshot, watery eyes. (Tr., p. 7, Ls. 15-19) Additionally, 
Nicolescu admitted to having consumed alcohol. (Tr., p. 7, Ls. 19-21) This is more than mere 
odor of alcohol and admission to drinking. In addition, the State has supplied Idaho case law 
wherein no more than the strong odor of alcohol was reasonable suspicion enough to pull 
someone over and require performance of field sobriety tests (State v. Thornley, 141 'Idaho 898, 
900-901, 120 P.3d 286, 288-289 (Ct.App. 2005)). Therefore it does logically follow that at the 
very least, reasonable suspicion existed in the instant case wherein Officer Palic had several 
other indicia of intoxication. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the Appellant requests the Court reverse the 
magistrate's decision and remand the case for further proceedings. 
DATED this _'1-=----- day of January 2013. 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
Sarah A. Millar 
Assistant City Attorney 
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.. 1.2':.sifas···r'fv1l ....................................... !saiai1 .. fiJiiWar:··r;·resei1t"fa·;:··tFie .. state·:···ECiwarci"'8"l:ie.rricii'5eitia···r;·;:e5·e;·il't .. tor ..  
! !the defendant 
.. 1.~Fstf3'5"F>'rviTJucf9'e ..................... ffi1i's .. 'is .. tra·iTi ... a ...memo .. d'e.ci's.ioi1 ... a.il'd ... a.rCie.r .. ¥ra·iTi .. 'J'u·a9·e .. Rawiey ............................ .. 
! !suppressing evidence obtained in a case involving a DUI arrest that 
1 !involved an accident. Because an airbag deployed there were 
1 !injuries consisting with either being under the influence of alcohol or 
l !the air bag being deployed;. Mr. Nicolescu had difficulty with 
1 !balance, some of the FST's ·were not administered. There was a ! !horizontal gaze administered. Judge Hawley believed there was a 
1 !violation of the 4th amendment, he was not given a choice of taking 
l lthe test, therefore any and all evidence obtained should be ! !suppressed. 
~ ' ~ 
..... f:'02·:·4'9 ... r.rvi ... IJiJCi9e ..................... tFi'e .. state .. ca.ilteil.Cis ... ii1at"whe.il ... ya'i:i ... 9.efa .. i5C.yo'l:i ... coi1sei1fto .. ie.siii19·: .......... .. 
l !The PBT is part of the testing that can be involved in this type of 
1 !situation and that other evidence should not have been suppressed. 
l !Did the officer say he was unsure 
f~~;~~m~~~~~~:=!~~~~~~r:;~#}~~~J~~f~~~:========:====:: 
.... f.o£i':'43 ... r'f\il .. "t'Ms ...... rv1iTier ......... tTi1e .. ma9·istraie ... c.a·u·ii"Ci'icfi1ot"cai15i'd·e;·r .. a.ii ... a'fii1e .. ia"Cta.rs .. whe.i1 .. comTil.9 .... 
I Ito their conclusion and that case law is clear. Reasonable suspicion. 
i i 
..... f:'OEF22 ... r.rv1 .... bua9·e ..................... tAd'm'is.s'ioi1 .. ara;:rilkii19.? ................................................................. : ................................................................................... .. 
..... f:'0£3':'2'9 ... r'Kil"'t'rv1s: .... rv1ii'ier ......... t.i .. 'h·a·ve ... a .. 'ii'8f"i ... wiTi .. r:e·a·c:rth.ra·u-9'h ... ii1af: .. fi1e .. Cieie.il'Ci·a·ilrwas .. Cirivi'i1·9·: .. ·ir ........ .. 
l !was 2am, there was a strong odor of alcohol coming from the breath 
1 jof the defendant. He stated he had not hit his head and had been 
! !medically cleared. Unsteady on his feet, blood shot watery eyes, 
l lfailed the HGN . 
..... f:.oa·:·34 ... r'Ki1"'tJuCi9e ..................... h::re .. haCi .. a .. scratci1eCi .. corn·e·a·: .. ·;;dha·t;s .. iNFiai"i"th.ou9Fifi".reaa·: ..................................  
:r~{~~~~i~~~~~ =r~a~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~!===== =====::::: 
..... f.1"1":'32 ... r.rvi ... Hili's·: ... MiTier ......... !fi1e .. state .. Ci'iCi"i1ai"ii1te·r;a .. ·c;·il ... aCimi'tti'i1'9"Ti¥e'ioci< ... res·u·ii5'Til.io .. eviCie·r;·c;e;·: ........ .. 
! !Presumptive test, something to help form a picture but not an 
l !evidentiary test. 
..... r.1·:z·:·a7 ... r.rv1 .... lJuCi9e ....... : ............. fwh·e·ii .. ii1at"te.st ... it"aCim.ii1i.ste.reCi ... i.ts ... r;·a·rt ... arti1e .. statute .. Ta·~aoo2 .. ff)"'you .. .. 
l lconsent to evidentiary testing? Or not? 
..... r·1·:z·:'36 ... r.rv1"'TM·s·: .. ·rv1me·r ......... fit ... c.a·u·ia .. 9·a ... eiih'e.r .. wai .. Usis ... i=adors: .. ·J\r:9·u·m·ei1C'tS"eds.io·r;·"ii1 .. tFie ....................  
l jHunter case, that is informative in the s,ense that PC was found in 
1 1that case. Ask to reverse the trial court and remand the case. 
i ~ 
................................................ 1 ......................................... 1 ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ . 
1:17:59 PM \Judge iState vs. Cooper, State vs. Ferraira, State vs. Thornley were all 
~ !cited . 
.... f.1·a·:·33 ... r.rvi .. lrv1·r: ............................... lJ\i·c;·c;·~s-eil·s·c;·;: .. ae;vrc·e .. ih'afTs ... li.suaiTy-to .. Ciete·c:£t'i1.e ... P'resei1ce .. ofa'icohor: .... .. 
\Guerricabeit\Reads from decision of Hawley. 
Ha \ 
: : 
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Judge Mclaughlin Clerk: A. Lycan Reporter: Mia Martorelli 4-3-13 Courtroom501 
1:20:47 PM !Judge !Lets take this hypothetically, there is an accident, one of the drivers 
· !is interviewed by a peace officer, deployed air bag, strong odor of I !alcohol and they admit to drinking or consuming alcohol . 
..... f.2i.3'5' .. F>.Kil .. TM·r: ............................... lrt1e .. officer··c;a·il ... rei.y .. o·;; ... c;.rearb'miy: ... J"usf's.imp.iy .. admTs5To.n ... iiri·;:r5·rr;·e;iror 
!Guerricabeitjalcohol doesn't rise to the level of suspicion. 
~ ia · ~ 
····r·2~fs9···F>·Kil···tJ"ua9e ..................... !rh"ere ... was ... a.n .. horizontai""9aie ... tesf·ar;···th"e···9·c;·aa··eye··c;·c;·rr:ea? ............................. .. 
..... r·2~F3'3 ... F>.rv1 .... Uvfr: ............................... frt1at"I5 ... r;.eiio.rmea .. o·il ... ho.ti1 ... eye·s· .. arth"e .. same .. fime·: .. rh"e .. i'ssue .. Is ..................... .. 
! Guerricabeit !whether or not the officer had reasonable suspicion before the 
!ia !administration of the test. The result is when he had his suspicion, 
! !not before that. Cites case. I don't challenge the consent issue, that 
! !is what Judge Hawley used for his decision. 
i i . 
..... f.27":·3·1 .... F>.Kil ... bua9e ..................... tso· .. ya'LJ .. ti'e"ii"e.ve"J'ua9·e ... RaiN'iey .. was ... il.o't"erroneo"i.J·s .. i·il ... co.mTil.9 .. "fo .. th"e .......... .. 
! !decision he did . 
..... r·2:r4·9 ... F>.Kil .. TKAr: ............................... lwh"at"stops ... o#i·c;·e·rs ... is .. ti1e .. 4iii ... a.m·ename.nf' .................................................................................... .. 
! Guerricabeit! 
!ia ! 
..... f:-3cEo2 .... F>.Ki1 ... 1"Jud9.e ..................... t'i~eaas ... iro·rr; ... tra·;;5cr.ipt" ...................................................................................................................................................... .. 
..... f.3cE5.if'F>.Kil .. TM·r: ............................... H .. aoil.ifheHeve ... ti1.e"Tli.a9·e .. r9·r;·or:ed .. ti1.a"t: ... th"ai'ie.st"imo.ily.Ts .. 2.6Ri6 ........................... . 
!Guerricabeit!hindsight. Page 20, lines 9-13. That's the basis of the decision. 
Ha i 
..... f.33·:·3~rF>·M· .. ·tJ"ud.9e ..................... t.i"d·ia·il;f's.ee .. a .. ta·r;·e· .. recordh19·; .. did .. h"e ... co.nsi'd'er .. that? ........................................................... .. 
..... f.3i'4'9" .. F>.Kil ... t'fiA"s·: ... rv1ii'iai ......... tfi:ftii.e'Tli.ci'9.es ... req·u·e·sfwe ... provrae·a .. ·auaro: .. ·irwas ... n.eve·r .. ad·;n·iHed ... af ........ .. 
! !the suppression hearing, but afterwards he requested a copy . 
..... f.34·:·23 ... F>.Kil .. ·t·M"r: ............................... h.wa·5·;;·;reven .. awa.re .. ofthat:"huf"i' .. ii'ave .. i1o ... o'b}e"Cti.on: ........................................................ .. 
! Guerricabeit! 
!ia ! 
..... f.34·:-3·s .... F>.Kil ... tiLid9.e .................... ti ... a.m ... a .. i'itiie .. concer.iled ... ahout"ti1e ... reco·ra·; .. r·i<·il·c;v;; .. h"e; .. r:ete.rred .. to .. i'f:' ............... .. 
: : 
ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooloooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooloOOooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo••ooooooooO•ooooooooooooooOooo••oooooooooOOOOOnoooO,.Ooooooooooooooooooooooooooo•••oooooooOOOOOoooooo•oooooooo 
1:34:51 PM jMr. jOn page 3 a footnote referenced it, I was not aware that it was 
lGuerricabeit!provided and I have no objection. 
!ia i 
..... f.35":T1 .... F>"M ... buCi9e ..................... tTh'e .. r:e·ca·ra .. r:etie"Cts .. th"at .. J"ua9e ... R.aiNi'ey ... m.a·d"e .. a .. r:e·C1·Li·es.fto.Ti5tei1 .. to ...........  
! !the audio tape, the state provided a copy of that audio and the 
! !defense has no objection to the court considering that as evidence. I 
\ \will need to get that, I need to listen to the tape . 
..... f:.36·:·a3···P·M· .. ·t·fiA·r: ............................... t·c·c;·il·trr;·u·e·s ... a.r9·u·m·e·ilt:" .. i"'iNiTi"i1oi"repres·e·ni"wh"at"h"e ... sai'Ci .. Til ... fh"e .. tape·; ... i ....... .. 
!Guerricabeit!heard the tape a long time ago. 
~ ia ~ 
:~~~~j~I~~~~~~~g~===~e~~~~r======:=======:==========:= 
! Guerricabeit l 
!ia ! 
..... 1":.39·:·?i1 ..... F>.Ki1 ... 1Iua9·e ..................... 1Ji:.il:Y .. evlae·;;·c;ed.h"af'th"e .. de¥e·ilaa·nrcaus.e'd' .. th"i"s ... a.cdd"e.il"t? ..............................................  
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1:39:29 PM j Mr. j Not that I'm aware of, I believe he was the one that got t-boned. 
~ Guerricabeit I 
lia l 
·····r·3g-:·4·9···P·M··tJucf9·e;···· ................ "twa·s··ihe···afi1er··ari"\ie·r·Til]"lj.r8CI?················································· .. ···································· .. ········ .. ··············· ............... . 
·····r·3!i:·5·6···P·M··Tr;ir: .............................. Tra·m···nai".awa.re·~····· ........................................................................................................................................................................  
j G uerricabeit j 
lia ! 
···T:40":·a;;rF>·rv;····tJ"uCI9e ................... tfiA"s: .. ··fi.iliTiar:··ya"Li .. ha·il·aea··fi1afia·p·e·T;;·?······························ .. ······································ .. ······································· 
·····f:·46":·1·4···P·M·Tfi.il·s:···iVirfiar ........ "ffd"Ci .. hei"ieve·T·ema·ire·c:raetense··c;auns.eC ................................................................................................  
..... f.4cF3·a····P·M··p"L1a9·e···················Tifis···nafin .. fi18 .. ¥ire········································································ .. ································ ..............................................................  
··· .. r·4;L0"1····P·M··Trv1"s·~···fi.ilwia·r· .. ······nrwas···an .. an .. e.m·a·ir-a·ffachmenCJ\r9.umenr·············································································· ... ······· 
·····r·4E:E.f1····P·M··pua9·e;····················lrwHi"""fai<e .. if·Li·ilaer:··aa·vrs·e·m·enTaiia···is·s·ue···a···c:rec"is.io·;;··wifil.in···1·6··aa·ys··········· 
·····f:46·:·26···P·M···t .. ·······································h~r;a···c;y·c:·a·se········································································································································································· ................ . 
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No. FILED 1 _, au A.M.----P.M-y , 
CARY B. COLAIANNI 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY 
Sarah A. Millar 
Assistant City Attorney 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
P.O. Box 500 
Boise, I~aho 83701-0500 
Telephone: (208) 384-3870 
Idaho State Bar No. 7439 
APR 0 9 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By DEIRDRE FINNEGAN 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
__________________________ ) 
Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076 
STIPULATION TO. SUPPLEMENT 
EVIDENCE IN SUPPRESSION HEARING 
COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through Assistant City Attorney Sarah A. 
Millar, and Defendant, by and through defense counsel Ed Guenicabeitia, and stipulate to the 
supplementing of evidence in the suppression hearing, with a copy of the_ officer's audio 
identified as State's Exhibit 2. 
DATEDthis r 
Ed Guerricabeitia 
Defense Counsel 
day of April, 2013~ DATED this q · day of April, 2013. 
Sarah A. Millar 
Assistant City Attorney 
STIPULATION TO SUPPLEMENT EVIDENCE IN SUPPRESSION HEARING -1 sam 
---· .. --·--··--·-- ·--------· .. ·-----··---~--·----- .. _____ ......... --··--. .. '"'-·------·" .. _____ ., ____ _. __ ._. ___ .. , 
'• 
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04-09-13;10:58AM; ;2p8 386 9428 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _3_ day of April, 2013, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Ed Guerricabeitia 
DAVISON COPPLE COPPLE & COPPLE 
Attorneys at Law 
PO Box 1583 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
~USMAIL . 
_INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
_FACSIMILE 
HAND DELIVER 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING- 2 
__ , __ ,_ .,-·~ - ...... -·. ···-····· ___ , ________ , ___ , __ -·-----·-··--····· -... ---- -·-·-·· -·· ·- ... . 
sam 
# 2/ 4 
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CARY B. COLAIANNI 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY 
Sarah A. Millar 
Assistant City Attorney. 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
P.O. Box 500 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500 · 
Telephone: (208) 384-3870 
Idaho State Bar No. 7439 
NO·---~~--;--,~­A.M.~·---F-IL~.~-~ _,_{_·.....;/ j~C,) 
APR 0 9 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By DEIRDRE FINNEGAN 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE. 
· STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU 
Defendant. 
) 
. ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_____________ ) 
Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076 
ORDER SUPPLEMENTING EVIDENCE 
IN SUPPRESSION HEARING 
HAVING CONSIDERED the Stipulation to Supplement Evidence in the Suppression 
Hearing, this court hereby supplements the evidence with the officer's audio, identified as State's 
Exhibit 2. 
DATED this -Z!:_ day of_~!ff'-TJ,...,_~::_::::..~-"""-lo.. ___ , 2013. 
ORDER SUPPLEMENTING EVIDENCE IN SUPPRESSION HEARING - 3 sam 
( . . 
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·CARY B. COLAIANNI 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY 
Sarah A. Millar 
Assistant City Attorney 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
P.O. Box500 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500 
Telephone: (208) 384-3870 
Idaho State BarNo. 7439 
;208 386 9428 . # 3/ 4 
NO.----F::::-tL-;::;::~.~:-. -:-I-:-1?~0~­
A.M.----' OS. 
APR 0 9 2013 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By DEIRDRE FINNEGAN 
DEPUTY 
IN '~;'HE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
__________________________ ) 
Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076 
STIPULATION AUGMENTING THE 
RECORD ON APPEAL 
COMES NOW the State, by and through Assistant City Attorney Sarah A. Millar, and 
.. 
Defendant, by and through defense counsel Ed Guerricabeitia, and stipulate to augment the 
record on appeal with State's Exhibit 2. 
DATED this s~ day of April, 2013. 
GP~£zt: 
Ed Guerricabeitia 
Defense Counsel 
DATED this Oj of April, 2013 
Sarah A. Millar 
Assistant City Attorney 
STIPULATION AUGMENTING THE RECORD ON APPEAL -1 sam 
.......... -------........ .,,______ _ .... _ ... ·---------- .. ., ... _______ _ 
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. ,, 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY thaton this 9 day of April, 2013, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
' 
Ed Guerricabeitia 
DAVISON COPPLE COPPLE & COPPLE 
Attorneys at Law 
PO Box 1S83 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
_kUSMAIL 
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL 
FACSIMILE 
HAND DELIVER 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING- 2 sam 
# 4/ 4 
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CARY B. COLAIANNI 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY 
Sarah A. Millar 
Assista11t City Attorney 
BOISE CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
P.O. Box 500 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500 
Telephone: (208) 384-3870 
Idaho State Bar No. 7439 
N0. ___ ---::::7="-~:----
FILED D 
A.M'----P.M. 7SCJ 
APR 16 2013 
CHRISTOPHER 0. RICH, Clerk 
By AMY LYCAN 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, Case No. CR-MD-2011-0017076 
v. 
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ORDER AUGMENTING THE RECORD 
ON APPEAL 
Defendant. 
_____________ ) 
HAVING CONSIDERED the Stipulation to Augment the Record on Appeal, this court 
hereby augments the record with State's Exhibit 2. 
DATED this 'llP {h day of _ _._A~'p'-'-r\L-\=-----' 2013. 
Hon. Michael McLaughlin · 
ORDER AUGMENTING THE RECORD ON APPEAL- 3 sam 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 16th day of April 2013, I caused to be served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to: 
Sarah A. Millar 
Boise City Prosecutor 
Ed Guerricabeitia 
Davidson, Copple, Copple, & Copple 
199 N. Capitol Blvd, Suite 600 
P.O. Box 1583 
Boise, ID 83701 
__ Notified available for pick up 
u.s. Mail 
Fax Transmission 
Hand Delivery 
~Interdepartmental Mail 
:{2 Notified available for pick up 
U.S. Mail 
Fax Transmission 
__ Hand Delivery 
__ Interdepartmental Mail 
BY: 
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NO. ___ <:ii~--r~~-
A.M ____ F1LI~~ 4YD 
APR 16 2013 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDI~b'P~~<(,!RJCH, Clork 
ByAMVLVCAN 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ~01( 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) 
) Case No. CR-MD-2011-17076 
vs. ) 
) 
KEVIN MICHAEL NICOLESCU, ) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
) AND ORDER 
) 
Defendant/Respondent. ) 
ATTORNEY FOR THE PETITIONER: SARAH MILLAR 
ATTORNEY FOR THE RESPONDENT: ED GUERRICABEITIA 
This case is before the Court on the state's appeal from the decision of the 
magistrate, Hon. John T. Hawley, Jr., granting the defendant's (Mr. Nicolescu's) 
motion to suppress. For the reasons that follow, the magistrate's decision will be 
reversed and this case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The following procedural statement is taken from the state's brief and appears 
to essentially be undisputed: 
On December 5, 2011, Nicolescu filed Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress Evidence. The State responded with its Brief in 
Opposition to the Suppression of Lifeloc Breath Test Results 
filed April 6, 2012. After several continuances, a hearing on 
Nicolescu's motion was held July 2, 2012, at 3:30 p.m. After 
consideration of testimony and the filings of both parties, the 
Memorandum Decision and Order 1 
000163
'r 
court issued a written opinion on July 25, 2012, granting the 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. The State thereafter 
concurrently filed a Notice of Appeal and Motion to Hold Matter 
in Abeyance on August 29, 2011. Appellant's Brief, at 3. 
The magistrate noted the factual findings in his decision: 
On October 15, 2011 Defendant, Kevin M. Nicolescu 
(Nicolescu) was involved in a two vehicle collision at the 
intersection of Idaho and 16th streets in Boise, Idaho. Boise 
City Police Officer Ransom responded to the scene. Officer 
Chris Palic of the Boise City Police Department then arrived on 
the scene and was directed to speak with Nicolescu. 
Nicolescu informed Officer Palic that he had proceeded 
through a green light west bound on Idaho Street when the 
other vehicle northbound on 16th Street apparently ran a red 
light and collided with his vehicle. While speaking with 
Nicolescu, Officer Palic detected a strong odor of an alcoholic 
beverage. In addition, Officer Palic noted that Nicolescu had 
red, bloodshot and watery eyes. There was no indication of 
slurred speech or impaired memory. There were some minor 
cuts and abrasions to Nicolescu's face, which Palic assumed 
were caused by the deployment of the airbag during the 
collision. Nicolescu agreed to speak with Palic. 
Nicolescu admitted that he had consumed alcohol earlier that 
evening. Officer Palic requested Nicolescu submit to a 
Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test. After starting the HGN 
test, Officer Palic had scored Nicolescu with 4 of 6 decision 
points, but did not complete the test due to an injury to 
Nicolescu's left eye which had occurred as a result of the 
accident. Nicolescu then indicated that his adrenaline was 
kicking in and Officer Palic observed Nicolescu's legs shaking 
and that he was unsteady on his feet. 
Palic discussed his observations with Officer Larry Moore, who 
was also on the scene. Palic explained to Moore that he had 
observed a strong odor of alcohol, glassy and bloodshot eyes, 
that Nicolescu had scored 4 of 6 decision points on the HGN 
(which would have been a failure) prior to terminating the test 
and that Nicolescu admitted he had consumed alcohol earlier 
that evening. The watery bloodshot eyes could have been 
caused by debris from the airbag deploying in the accident and 
it is also possible they resulted from Nicolescu consuming 
alcohol or even a combination of both factors. Palic explained 
Memorandum Decision and Order 2 
000164
that he did not want to perform other FSTs because Nicolescu 
was visibly shaken by the accident. 
Palic was not aware of any traffic infractions or driving pattern 
because his only contact with Nicolescu was after the 
accident.1 Palic testified that he felt that he had enough 
information to arrest Nicolescu for suspicion of DUI. Palic 
testified that based on the totality of the circumstances he told 
Officer Moore that he felt Nicolescu was not safe to operate a 
motor vehicle. Officer Moore, who had witnessed the 
discussion between Palic and Nicolescu, agreed that Palic 
should continue his investigation to determine if Nicolescu was 
safe to operate a motor vehicle or whether he might be under 
the influence of alcohol. Paramedics on the scene examined 
Nicolescu and noted that he had a scratched cornea 
Thereafter, Officer Palic told Nicolescu that he was not going to 
continue the HGN test because of the eye injury and because 
Nicolescu was shaken up. 
Palic then stated: 'What I am going to have you do is blow into 
a device (Aicosensor) and we'll just go from there. O.K. and 
we'll go from there. I will make my determination from there.' 
Nicolescu replied: 'Dude, I'm willing to cooperate however.' 
Palic stated: 'It will be a lot easier to do it this way, O.K.' 
There was no audible response by Nicolescu and Palic then 
continued by explaining that Nicolescu would need to make a 
tight seal around the pipe and blow real hard. 
Nicolescu submitted to the preliminary breath test [PBT] on the 
Alco-Sensor, which is a handheld breath alcohol tester. The 
Alco-Sensor is not certified and is not performance verified. It is 
used to detect the presence of alcohol in individuals. The result 
of the preliminary Alco-Sensor test was .1 08 which is over the 
legal limit. Officer Palic then handcuffed Nicolescu and placed 
him in Palic's patrol vehicle to provide further breath samples. 
After a 15 minute wait period and an ALS [administrative 
license suspension] advisory, using the Lifeloc instrument ... 
Nicolescu provided further samples which registered results of 
.1 03 and .096. Nicolescu was then cited - not arrested - for 
1 Officer Palic was aware that Mr. Nicolescu had been drinking and was involved in an automobile accident, at 
or around 2 a.m., irrespective of Mr. Nicolescu's version of the cause of that accident. 
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Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a misdemeanor 
violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004. Nicolescu was not 
transported to the Ada County Jail to be booked for the DUI, 
rather he was transported to St. Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center for treatment of the eye injury. Memorandum Decision & 
Order, at 1-4. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When a district judge considers an appeal from a magistrate judge (not 
involving a trial de novo), the district judge is acting as an appellate court, not as a 
trial court. State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 596, 826 P.2d 1306, 1308 (1992). The 
interpretation of law or statute is a question of law over which the Court has free 
review. State v. Miller, 134 Idaho 458, 462, 4 P.3d 570, 574 (Ct. App. 2000). 
I.C.R. 54.1 ("Appeals from a magistrate to a district court - Appealable 
judgments and orders." provides that "[a]n appeal may be taken to the district judge's 
'division of the district court from any of the following judgments, orders or decisions 
rendered by a magistrate ... (d) An order granting a motion to suppress evidence in 
a misdemeanor criminal action .... " 
A. Suppression 
"At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, 
resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the 
trial court." State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 648, 167 P.3d 783, 785 (Ct. App. 2007). 
"When reviewing 'seizure' issues, we defer to the trial court's factual findings 
unless they are clearly erroneous.2 We freely review, de novo, the trial court's legal 
2See also State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 234, 127 P.3d 133, 137 (2005) ("The Court accepts the trial court's 
fmdings of fact if supported by substantial evidence."). 
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determination of whether or not an illegal seizure occurred." State v. Schwarz, 133 , 
I 
Idaho 463, 466, 988 P.2d 689, 692 (1999). 
ANALYSIS 
In this appeal, the state asserts that the magistrate erred when he concluded 
that sufficient evidence did not exist to allow officers to administer a breath test of Mr. 
Nicolescu. See Appellant's Brief, at 3. 
In his decision, the magistrate concluded that "[t]aking one's breath for a 
preliminary breath test is a search under the Fourth Amendment." Memorandum 
Decision and Order, at 7. The magistrate also concluded that Mr. Nicolescu "was not 
given the choice to submit to or decline preliminary breath testing. He was merely told 
that he was going to have to blow into a devicl ... In this case Nicolescu acquiesced 
when he was told he was going to blow intl a device. Mere submission to lawful 
authority does not equate to consent .... " /d.,lat 8-9. 
The state contends "an officer does hot have to obtain specific consent to 
administer a breath or blood test from a sus~ect who has been driving." Appellant's 
I 
Brief, at 4. "Thus, if the preliminary breath test administered by Palic is considered an 
evidentiary test for purposes of Idaho cJde § 18-8002( 1), then consent had 
previously been given by the defendant when! he drove his vehicle that night, and the 
magistrate court erred in holding that Nicolescu h'ad failed to give consent." /d., at 6. 
The state relies on I.C. 18-8002(1) in support of its contention. That statute 
does provide that "[a]ny person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have! given his consent to evidentiary testing 
for concentration of alcohol as defined in section 18-8004, Idaho Code, and to have 
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given his consent to evidentiary testing for the presence of drugs or other intoxicating 
substances, provided that such testing is ad~inistered at the request of a peace 
officer having reasonable grounds to believe that person has been driving or in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of the provisions of section 18-8004, 
Idaho Code, or section 18-8006, Idaho Code." 
However, if this were considered as an evidentiary test, Mr. Nicolescu would 
also have the right to be informed, "[a]t the time of the evidentiary testing ... that if he 
refuses to submit to or if he fails to complete, evidentiary testing" he is subject to 
certain sanctions. Mr. Nicolescu was not informed of this, and since the court does 
not believe that a preliminary breath test is an "evidentiary test," so it appears that 
this code section cannot be relied upon to provide implied consent for Mr. Nicolescu. 
Alternatively, the state argues that "the preliminary breath test is not an 
-evidentiary test for purposes of Idaho Code § 18-8002(1) but rather a roadside field 
sobriety test requiring reasonable suspicion." Appellant's Brief, at 6.3 
3Mr. Nicolescu argues that even preliminary breath tests are evidentiary tests under the Idaho Code and, 
therefore, all such testing must comply with the standards in the code for such tests. See Respondent's Brief, at 
16-19. The code defmes the term "evidentiary testing" as "a procedure or test or series of procedures or tests 
utilized to determine the concentration of alcohol or the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances in a 
person . . . for the purpose of determining alcohol concentration . . . the results of any test for alcohol 
concentration and records relating to calibration, approval, certification or quality control performed by a 
laboratory operated and approved by the Idaho state police or by any other method approved by the Idaho state 
police shall be admissible in any proceeding in this state without the necessity of producing a witness to establish 
the reliability of the testing procedure for examination." I.C. § 18-8002A(l)(e). See also I.C. § 18-8002(9). 
"Evidentiary testing" means a test that is conducted for the purpose of determining alcohol concentration. In 
other words, an evidentiary test is a test conducted for the purpose of establishing proof of the level of alcohol 
concentration in a person. That is not the purpose of a preliminary breath test. A preliminary breath test is 
utilized, as discussed in more detail hereinafter, like any other field sobriety test, as "a method for making a 
threshold determination as to whether a person has consumed alcohol." State v. Lucas, 934 N.E.2d 202, 205 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2010). A preliminary breath test, consequently, is not an evidentiary test, as that term is described in the 
Idaho Code. 
Preliminary breath tests are not specifically authorized by the Idaho Code (neither are they specifically 
prohibited). However, the court fmds that not to be dispositive, as none of the other field sobriety tests are also 
specifically authorized by the code. They are simply investigative tools which can be utilized by police officers 
in determining probable cause and are constitutionally authorized as "reasonable" searches and seizures. See 
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The state relies on State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 988 P.2d 700 (Ct. App. 
1999), in support of its contentions. In that case, the court noted "[a] seizure occurs-
and the Fourth Amendment is implicated-when an officer, by means of physical 
force or show of authority, has in some way restrained a citizen's liberty. The critical 
inquiry is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the 
encounter, the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that 
he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business. When 
an officer administers field sobriety tests, the driver of the vehicle is not free to ignore 
the officer's request. Thus, there can be no doubt that the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution was implicated by the administration of field sobriety tests 
in the instant case." 133 Idaho at 479, 988 P.2d at 705. 
"A search without a warrant is per se unreasonable unless it falls within one of 
the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment requirements. One of the exceptions is 
when the police validly stop a person to investigate possible criminal behavior, even 
though there is no probable cause to make an arrest ... an investigatory ... stop is 
justified under the Fourth Amendment if there is a reasonable and articulable 
suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime." /d. 
"Field sobriety tests are, by their very definition, done in the 'field' typically on 
the side of a public thoroughfare and are ordinarily performed contemporaneously 
with a traffic stop . . . although Ferreira testified that he did not did not believe he 
could refuse the [field test sobriety test] request, that does not elevate the detention 
into a de facto arrest. In any investigative detention the individual is not free to leave; 
Ferreira, 133 Idaho at 480, 988 P.2d at 706 ("[F]ield sobriety tests are reasonable methods of conducting an 
investigation, based on specific articulable facts that a driver is operating his ... vehicle contrary to I.C. § 18-
8004."). 
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that element of compulsion is what distinguishes an investigative detention from a 
consensual encounter . . . we conclude that the administration of field sobriety tests 
following a traffic stop is but an investigative detention." 133 Idaho at 706, 988 P.2d 
at 480. 
"To determine whether a search conducted within an investigative detention is 
reasonable, and, therefore, constitutionally permissible, the Court must balance the 
state's interest in conducting the search against the level of intrusion into individual's 
privacy that the search entails." /d. "[T]he state's interest in stopping drunk driving is 
compelling, and the protection of its citizens from life-threatening danger is of 
paramount concern. An individual's privacy is certainly intruded upon by the 
administration of field sobriety tests. However, the state's interest is overwhelming 
\ 
and outweighs the intrusion into a driver's privacy and, thus, we hold that field 
:sobriety tests are reasonable methods of conducting an investigation, based upon 
specific and articulable facts that a driver is operating his ... vehicle contrary to I. C.§ 
18-8004." /d. 
In the Court's view, Mr. Nicolescu performed the preliminary breath test in an 
investigative detention setting. "The factors to be considered in distinguishing an 
investigative stop from a de facto arrest include the seriousness of the crime, the 
location of the encounter, the length of the detention, the reasonableness of the 
officer's display of force, and the conduct of the suspect as the encounter unfolds." /d. 
"An arrest is characterized as a full-scale seizure of the person requiring probable 
cause." 133 Idaho at 479, 988 P.2d at 705. 
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.. ) 
Prior to performing the breath test, Mr. Nicolescu was not handcuffed. He was 
not in the police station or other law enforcement setting. His suspected crime was 
driving under the influence. The length of time to perform the breath test was short. In 
sum, the circumstances surrounding the preliminary breath test were essentially the 
same or similar to the field sobriety testing setting, except for the nature of the test 
itself. See State v. Lucas, 934 N.E.2d 202, 205 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) ("[A] PBT 
[preliminary breath test] is a handheld apparatus used to conduct breath tests in the 
field ... PBTs are akin to general field sobriety tests and provide officers with a 
simple method for making a threshold determination as to whether a person has 
consumed alcohol."). See also State v. Kinney, 190 Vt. 195, 203, 27 A.3d 348 (2011) 
(Johnson, J., concurring) ("Like physical field sobriety tests, such as the HGN test or 
field dexterity tests, PBT results may be used as an investigative tool."). 
The nature of the breath test is arguably more intrusive than field sobriety 
testing, since, rather than being directed to perform a series of tests of bodily 
movements, the person is directed to breathe into a handheld measuring device. 
However, it also would take much less time for an individual to breathe into this 
device than to undergo the full array of standard field sobriety testing. 
As previously noted, the Court of Appeals has held "the state's interest in 
stopping drunk driving is compelling and . . . of paramount concern." The 
circumstances in this case demonstrate that it is not feasible to require the 
performance of the standard field sobriety tests because it is not clear, due to the 
after effects of the accident, how much of a suspect's bodily actions are the result of 
intoxication or of the accident, the state's interest in stopping drunk driving outweighs 
Memorandum Decision and Order 9 
000171
" .I 
the suspect's privacy concerns in relation to an investigatory field breath test and this 
is the least intrusive means to further the investigation. See Ferriera, 133 Idaho at 
482, 988 P.2d at 708 ("The investigative methods utilized during an investigative 
seizure should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel 
the officer's suspicion in a short period of time."). In addition, as with other field 
sobriety testing, a preliminary breath test requires reasonable suspicion and not 
probable cause, for the test to be authorized. See id., 133 Idaho at 481, 988 P.2d at 
707 ('"[T]he dual purposes of roadside field sobriety tests are to either confirm or 
dispel the police officer's suspicion that the driving is operating his ... motor vehicle 
contrary to the law."); July 2, 2012 Motion to Suppress Hearing Transcript, at 40 
(Officer Palic's testimony that Mr. Nicolescu would not have been arrested if he "had 
blown ... under a .08."). See a/so Ferriera, 133 Idaho at 487, 988 P.2d at 708 ("[T]he 
.... Constitution requires only that a police officer possess reasonable suspicion that 
a person is driving in violation of I.C. § 18-8004 before field sobriety tests may be 
administered."). 
Reasonable suspicion has been found to exist where an officer is aware of 
driving behavior that is outside of "what can be described as normal driving behavior," 
particularly when this occurs late at night. See State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 
916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). "[W]e have found probable cause where the 
defendant had driven erratically, emitted a strong odor of alcohol, slurred his speech, 
and admitted to consuming alcohol." State v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho 775, 
779, 275 P .3d 1, 5 (Ct. App. 2012). 
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Officer Palic testified that on October 15, 2011, he was dispatched to the 
scene of an accident, at 2:00 in the morning. "[T]he investigating officer of the 
collision had suspected that there may be a possible DUI .... "July 2, 2012 Motion to 
Suppress Hearing Transcript, at 6. Upon making contact with Mr. Nicolescu, the 
driver of one of the vehicles, Officer Palic "detected a very strong odor of alcoholic 
beverage coming from his breath ... he was very unsteady on his feet, he had a 
pretty severe sway in the stationary stance; I noted that he had red, bloodshot, 
watery eyes; and he also admitted to me that he had been consuming alcohol that 
night." /d., at 7. 
Officer Palic said he was concerned about whether Mr. Nicolescu's 
involvement in the accident would affect his ability to perform field sobriety tests. Mr. 
Nicolescu told him that "he was medically cleared." /d., at 8. However, he was only 
able to obtain a partial nystagmus test. He then chose not to continue with further 
field sobriety testing "because it was clear to me that he had some adrenaline kicking 
in from his collision; he was starting to shake. He even indicated to me that he was 
very unsteady on his feet." /d., at 10. 
"After he had gotten medically cleared, I made a decision to try to use a 
preliminary breath test and obtain a reading to see if there was a detection of alcohol 
in his system, to confirm what I'd been seeing." /d. 4 
4Mr. Nicolescu argues that the preliminary breath test results were not admissible because "Officer Palic 
admitted that he did not observe the 15 minute period prior to administering the ... test." Respondent's Brief, at 
15. Again, a PBT is not an evidentiary test, as that term is utilized in the Idaho Code. Rather, as previously noted, 
it is another type of field sobriety test. "PBT devices are typically uncertified by the Department of Toxicology .. 
. so their results tend to be inadmissible at trial." Lucas, 934 N.E.2d at 205. However, the court believes that 
PBTs they are admissible in a suppression hearing context, to show that there was reasonable suspicion to 
believe that the'individual was driving drunk, warranting true evidentiary testing, as occurred here. See Kinney, 
190 Vt. at 203, 27 A.3d at 354 ("A preliminary breath test is not as accurate as an evidentiary breath test, which 
is taken with a more sophisticated instrument ... results ofPBTs are inadmissible as evidence of impairment and 
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Officer Palic knew that Mr. Nicolescu had been involved in a traffic accident 
early in the morning, had a very strong odor of alcohol on his breath, and he admitted 
to having been drinking. He also observed that Mr. Nicolescu was "very unsteady on 
his feet ... pretty severe sway ... red, bloodshot, watery eyes .... "/d., at 7. While 
Officer Palic conceded that there were "plausible ... explanations for the bloodshot, 
glassy eyes and ... the lack of field sobriety tests," (id., at 22) (i.e., the after effects of 
the accident), in the court's view, he had reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. 
Nicolescu was driving under the influence.5 See State v. Cooper, 119 Idaho 654, 656, 
809 P.2d 515, 517 (Ct. App. 1991) ("The report [the officer] received [that Cooper 
was involved in a roll-over accident and an EMT on the scene "'could smell alcohol, a 
fruity odor, similar to alcohol' coming from her breath or clothing"] certainly gave the 
officer a 'reasonable articulable suspicion' warranting 'further investigation' into the 
possibility that the driver had been drinking."). 
Since Officer Palic had reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. Nicolescu was 
driving under the influence, and it was not feasible to have him undergo standard field 
sobriety testing, Officer Palic was authorized to direct him to submit to the preliminary 
breath test, with or without his consent. 
may be used to detennine whether more accurate testing is appropriate."). See also State v. Carver, 2001 WL 
34094000, *I (D. Id.) ("From a review of case law, it appears to this Court that the near unanimous holdings of 
Courts in other jurisdictions throughout the nation has been to limit the use of the preliminary breath testing 
devices to detennining the issue of probable cause."). 
50fficer Moore was also present that evening and he also "could smell the odor of alcoholic beverage ... he also 
appeared to have ... red, bloodshot eyes. He admitted that he was involved in a ... crash, and that he was the 
driver .... " Id., at 30-31. 
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CONCLUSION 
In view of the foregoing, the magistrate's decision granting Mr. Nicolescu's 
motion to suppress is hereby reversed, and this case is remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this decision. 
~Y' 
SO ORDERED AND DATED THIS~ day of Apri12013. 
Michael Mclaughlin 
Senior District Judge 
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2. That Appellant, Kevin Michael Nicolescu, has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme 
Court, and the judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under 
and pursuant to Rule 11 ( c )(1 0), I.A.R. 
3. Appellant intends to assert the following issues on appeal: 
4. 
a. Whether the District Court erred and/or abused its discretion in finding as 
a matter of law that the preliminary breath test performed was not an 
evidentiary test as described in the Idaho Code; 
b. Whether the District Court erred and/or abused its discretion in finding as 
a matter of law that Officer Palic had reasonable suspicion and/or probable 
cause to perform the preliminary breath test; 
c. Whether the District Court erred and/or abused its discretion in fmding as 
a matter of law that the preliminary breath test performed with the Alcor-
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and/or probable cause to administer further evidentiary testing with the 
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a. Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes. 
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